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Introduction
In this paper I consider whether the transnational framing processes of solidarity movements have the
ability to influence government policy. In what conditions do transnational solidarity movements
create, expand and/or seize political opportunities? I argue that for most of their history, challengers to
power, including solidarity movements, often appear ineffectual and constrained by their political
environment. However, during this period there exists a complex relationship between opportunity and
agency in which political environments unfavorable to mobilization makes challengers attempt to
reshape dominant ideologies and political agendas before they can have a significant influence on
policy makers. In other words, those trying to challenge power are engaged in a protracted war of
position in which information is their primary instrument with which to shape a political environment.
During this period groups develop the capacity that allows them to successfully adapt, or attempt to do
so, to expanding political opportunities. This capacity includes, but is not limited to, the creation of a
persuasive alternative media, alliances with extra-movement institutions such as religious institutions
and a sense of collective identity that facilitates sustained political contention.
I demonstrate these theoretical propositions through a comparison of the US based solidarity
movement for Palestine with earlier US solidarity movements for East Timor and Central America. In
these latter two cases movement successes occurred during periods of expanding political opportunities
combined with an increased social awareness of the movements’ main concerns and strong facilitating
organizations. In the East Timorese context, activists used the period from 1975 until the early 1990s to
develop strong internal communications networks, alternative media and relationships with the leaders
of the East Timorese national movement that allowed them to persuade policy makers to withdraw US
support for Indonesia's occupation. The US Central America Peace movement, by contrast, exerted
influence over policy makers largely because of the legacy of the Vietnam war had tarnished the
ideological appeal of US foreign policy and helped to generate a substantial number of anti-war groups





and progressive Church movements that facilitated the movements growth. Thus, the rapid
mobilization of the Central America solidarity movement can be credited in part to the preceding
decades of a leftwing war of position in American politics.
In the context of the transnational movement for Palestine, the analysis in this paper reveals
three general conclusions about the relationship between transnational framing processes and political
environment. First, the movement is a diffuse, loosely connected and decentralized network made up of
localized activist groups. The movement’s structure is to a considerable degree due to the dynamics of
repression in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) and the difficulty of making Palestinian
grievances resonate internationally. Second, using a political opportunity framework I argue that unlike
the solidarity movements for East Timor and Central America, the US section of the Palestinian
solidarity movement faces challenges that will likely reduce its ability to be effective. However,
through comparisons with the East Timor and Central America solidarity movements we can begin to
identify particular tactics and strategic approaches that can help the Palestine solidarity activists act
upon political opportunities, if they arise in the future. Third, I examine the use of transnational
framing processes and “new media,” such as viral Internet videos and low budget documentaries, to
build ties between activists and to help the movement overcome some of the obstacles it faces. By
investigating the specifically transnational and international elements of the movement (framing
processes, information politics) we can identify potential advantages, such as “new media” that the
movement may have recourse to in future framing contests. In other words, while the constraints
revealed by the opportunity framework cannot be ignored, they cannot be treated as fait accompli
either. It is almost invariably the case that the success of any solidarity movement appears obvious only
in hindsight. At the time these movements arose they were all by definition outside of the mainstream
view they sought to influence, and undertaking to change entrenched views is always a risky and
uncertain objective. But it can be accomplished.





The Object of this Study
The transnational solidarity movement for Palestine is important because of its political impact and
also because it raises questions about how social movements opposing US imperialism develop,
succeed and fail. Although solidarity with the Palestinians has received a considerable amount of
media attention, scholars have not attempted to apply social movement concepts to this particular
movement. This is the case for both the transnational and the domestic components of the solidarity
network. This paper is an attempt to use social movement concepts to illuminate the dynamics and
potential of an under-studied movement. I also hope that by using the social movement theory tool-kit I
can help to better explain the transnational movement for Palestine to its members and highlight some
of the constraints and challenges that it faces.
As a starting point for this study I use Sidney Tarrow’s definition of a social movements as,
“collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with
elites, opponents, and authorities” (1998: 4) and Tarrow and Donatella Della Porta’s insight that
transnational movements are largely defined by,
three important processes of transnationalization: diffusion, domestication, and externalization.
By diffusion we mean, the spread of movement ideas, practices and frames from one country to
another; by domestication, we mean the playing out on domestic territory of conflicts that have
their origin externally; and by externalization, we mean the challenge to supranational
institutions to intervene in domestic problems or conflicts. (2005: 2)
Pro-Palestinian activism is to a considerable degree the effect of the first two types of mobilization
described by Tarrow and Della Porta. Through the diffusion of common interpretations of the of the
Palestine-Israel conflict that emphasize Israel’s colonial history, its exclusion and marginalization of
Palestinians from political life, its violations of international law and the similarities between Israel and
apartheid South Africa, Palestinians and non-Palestinians have constructed a shared history of the
conflict in Palestine. They have also established a common belief that transnational activism can help
bring a just end to it. Activists outside of Palestine domesticate the conflict by voicing Palestinian





grievances within their communities, schools, and religious institutions, elected representatives and
corporations that do business with Israel. Appropriating the Palestine-Israel conflict to local
circumstances is not limited to simply publicizing Palestinian narratives, but involves a complex
process of identifying and targeting the often-subtle connections between the subjugation of the
Palestinians and a local context. The Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National
Committee (BNC), helps to guide activists in this process by compiling information on multinational
corporations that sell weapons to Israel, Israeli companies that are based in the OPT and cultural icons,
for example Jean Luc Godard and Leonard Cohen, who are planning well-publicized visits to Israel.
Palestinian activists and their allies are limited in their ability to externalize the conflict to international
organizations. A central contention of this paper is that US imperialism has denied the transnational
movement for Palestine the advantage of using international institutions such as the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) for support.
The transnational solidarity movement is a large and rapidly expanding phenomenon that has
won recent and important victories in Africa, Europe and the United States. For example, in January
2009 South African dockworkers under the guidance of the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU) refused to unload an Israeli cargo ship in Durban, enacting a COSATU decision from 2004
to join in a comprehensive boycott of Israel. During the summer of 2009 the French rail company
Veolia announced that it would withdraw from a plan to build a light rail line between Tel Aviv and
Jerusalem in part because of grassroots pressure against the project (Barghouti 2009). Because
important trade unions and governments made these decisions, respectively, they represent two of the
most important victories to date of the solidarity movement. However, due to time constraints and the
difficulty in finding information on the mobilizations behind these events, this paper does not report in
detail on them. Although this paper examines particular groups or episodes in the history of
transnational activism for Palestine its subjects are typically US based, its primary aim is not to provide
detailed treatments of particular group histories or movement victories. Rather, it should be viewed as




is a historicized analysis of a transnational social movement that examines its mobilization dynamics,
prospects for success and political and communicative strategies in the contexts of international,
national and local political fields.
There is also a positive reason for focusing largely on US based groups: the US is the principle
military, economic and diplomatic sponsor of the Occupation outside of Israel itself. Were the US to
suspend the roughly $3 billion in aid that it gives Israel annually and allow UNSC resolutions
condemning Israeli policy to pass, it is highly plausible that Israel would have to end its Occupation of
Palestine and its aggression towards Lebanon. For these reasons, the US based solidarity movement
should be of particular concern to scholars and activists.

The Second Dimension of Power
In his study of coal miners in the Appalachians, John Gaventa argues that political power is expressed
through three interdependent dimensions: the ability of actors to participate in decision making
processes; the ability of actors, organizations and institutions to create political agendas for others—in
this context, “by preventing issues from arising, so too many actors are prevented from acting”(1982:
9); and the capacity of social forces, not just individuals and institutions, to produce consent for the
political status quo by shaping the public’s demands and expectations from politics.
The study of transnational social movements in general, and the transnational movement for the
Palestinians in particular, relate primarily to Gaventa’s second dimension of power. The Palestinian
right of self-determination is not part of the political agenda in the United States. Palestinian solidarity
activists are viewed in the media and in government as solidly outside of the mainstream. Before
political opportunities can be seized, if they become available, the dominant discourse on PalestineIsrael would have to shift dramatically to recognize both the historic and ongoing suffering of the
Palestinians, their right of self-determination and the fundamentally discriminatory characteristics of





Zionism. Only then will the Palestinians and their allies be able to persuade governments to shift their
support away from Israel and towards the Palestinians.
What are the main axioms of this discourse and what institutions and actors reproduce it?
Palestinian-Jordanian scholar Joseph Massad writes that, in the United States, discussion of the
Palestine-Israel conflict is a “discursive space that places the Palestinians on its border, faced with
checkpoints that mainly keep us out but do allow some entry” (1993: 94). Massad is echoing the
arguments Edward Said put forward in his essay Permission to Narrate which was written in the
aftermath of Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the infamous collusion of Israeli and Phalangist
fighters in the Sabra and Shatilla massacre that took place in the same year. Said noticed that despite
the proliferation of books and news coverage of the invasion and the massacre, many authors seemed to
go out of their way to avoid speaking with Palestinians or discussing the fundamental prejudices
inherent in a self-described “Jewish-state.” Said attributed these elisions to, “a disciplinary
communications apparatus [that] exists in the West both for overlooking most of the things that might
present Israel in a bad light, and for punishing those who try to tell the truth.” (2000: 247) In a recent
essay, titled “The Israelization of American Middle East Policy Discourse” Joel Beinin argues that the
September 11, 2001 attacks have “consolidated an understanding of the world drawing sharp
oppositions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and positing Islam as the ‘new enemy for a new world order’”
(2003a: 125). In this context, Palestinians are erased from public discourse except when presented as a
threatening enemy. Additionally, pro-Israel and pro-US imperialism institutions such as the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy (a spin-off of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee,
the most powerful pro-Israel lobby in the US) enjoy increased authority within the media and
government (Beinin 2003b; 2003c).
The dominance of this ideology is the primary problem facing Palestinian solidarity activists,
particularly those in the United States. By comparison, the East Timorese and Central American
solidarity movements were able to successfully persuade policy-makers to restrict US support for its




clients once the dominant ideological position in support of Indonesia, the Contras and the militaryoligarchy power-blocs in El Salvador and Guatemala had been punctured. Changes in political
discourse, are the effect of extra-discursive events (such as the Santa Cruz massacres in East Timor or
the killing of Arch Bishop Oscar Romero in El Salvador) that forced a reconsidering of US foreign
policy and the work that activists do to sustain and spread counter-hegemonic consciousness through
contention with elites and non-elites. Through comparisons with other solidarity movements and
analysis of the information politics of the transnational movement for Palestine this paper aims to
uncover and discuss the mechanisms of power facing the Palestinians and their allies. Examining
specifically, the potential for activists to push these mechanisms to their limits as well as the broader
constitution of political opportunities in which Palestinian solidarity activists can make US policy
overlap with the objectives of the Palestinian struggle.

Organization
The arguments presented in this paper attempt to fill particular gaps in the scholarly knowledge of the
transnational solidarity movement for Palestine. Chapter One is a descriptive history of transnational
solidarity for the Palestinians since the beginning of the second intifada (fall 2000). During the 21

st

century mobilized international solidarity with the Palestinians has proven to be a popular, resistant and
innovative force in world politics. This chapter introduces some of the principle organizations and
individuals in the transnational solidarity movement; briefly tells the stories of how these organizations
formed and the strategies they deployed; considers reasons for the rise and decline of certain groups
and tactics and explains how the movement relates to the Palestinian national movement proper.
The next chapter puts the US based component of the Palestine solidarity movement in a
comparison with recent US solidarity movements for East Timor and Central America. In all three
cases movements have used similar repertoires, including but not limited to boycotts, divestment,
public demonstrations and familiar discourses such as human rights and self-determination in order to





challenge the US government’s relationship with a third world client guilty of systematic human rights
abuses. The movements for East Timor and Central America are all credited with helping to change US
policy.
I argue that particular configurations of political opportunity explain the variations in
movement strategy and outcomes between these cases. The comparisons reinforce the salience of
political opportunities in limiting how far a movement can influence or impact a political environment
and supports the general hypothesis of the political opportunity framework that elite allies, support
from public opinion and the lack of a credible opposition are crucial determinants in the success of
social movements in democratic politics. These comparisons highlight the remarkably unfavorable
circumstances facing the US based solidarity movement for Palestine, which has few significant elite
allies, faces enormous opposition and has a difficult relationship with public opinion and the news
media. I argue that the absence of political openings will continue to prohibit the solidarity movement
from having the type of influence over US policy that it covets, despite its recent innovations in tactics
and strategy.
Chapter Three connects the subjective transnational framing tactics of the movement to the
objective, structural conditions of the international system. The objectives of this chapter are to clarify
the principle mechanisms and processes by which transnational solidarity with the Palestinians is
constructed and to demonstrate the ways in which activists at all levels are developing new political
resources through these processes. I argue that US primacy in the inter-state system has prevented the
Palestinians and their allies from externalizing their cause to influential international organizations. As
a result the transnational movement for Palestine is an example of globalization from below: it is reliant
upon the discourses and norms of globalization such as international law and universal human rights
and it targets multinational businesses that have direct links to the Occupation. However, because it
lacks strong state sponsors or support from international organizations it is made up of grassroots and
civil society groups. Thus, the movement has developed through the multiplication of localized




iterations connected by a shared injustice frame. At the center of this frame is the analogy between the
situation in Palestine and the history of apartheid South Africa. This analogy allows actors to easily
explain a problem and produce an understanding of how it can be redresses; the Occupation of
Palestine is morally indefensible because it recalls the abhorrent racial discrimination of South African
apartheid and just as in the apartheid context it can be ameliorated through a global campaign of
boycotts, divestment and sanctions against Israel. The processes described in this chapter (as well as
Chapters One and Four) explains the ways in which the US based solidarity movement is connected to
and inter-dependent with its counterparts throughout the world as well as Palestinian national leaders.
Chapter Four extends this analysis by examining the role of new media such as viral videos and
low-budget documentaries in the construction of the solidarity movement. These videos are a key
resource for the solidarity movement because they can easily cross national borders, create common
repositories of knowledge and signal the movement’s increasing ability to represent the Palestine-Israel
conflict in its own terms. These projects are analyzed as both strategic deployments intended to
influence potential supporters and as reflexive practices that reveal the ways in which Palestinian,
Israeli and international activists conceptualize their own agency.





1: The Making of the Transnational Solidarity Movement for Palestine
Witnessing, shielding and voicing: solidarity groups and their tactics, 2000-2004
The outbreak of the second intifada provided the impetus for a new era of transnational solidarity with
the Palestinians. The intifada began simultaneously with the breakdown of peace negotiations between
Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). During July and August of 2000 Israelis and
Palestinians negotiated under American auspices at Camp David ostensibly to broker a final resolution
of their century old conflict. The negotiations faltered over Israel and America’s unwillingness to grant
the Palestinians sovereignty over significant economic, religious, cultural and geographic parts of the
central West Bank and East Jerusalem (Ben Ami 2006: 246-265; Enderlin 2003: 177-261; Finkelstein
2007). As a negotiated settlement appeared increasingly unlikely, Israeli and Palestinian officials began
to make preparations to manage the aftermath. According to Charles Enderlin, while at Camp David
Israeli negotiators crafted a simple message to deliver to the international public: the negotiations failed
because of Yasser Arafat’s unwillingness to accept an unprecedented and generous offer of statehood.
On the Palestinian side, Marwan Barghouti and his associates began planning protests modeled after
the famous demonstrations of the first intifada (1987-1993) in order to draw international attention to
and create criticism of Israel’s occupation thereby hopefully giving the Palestinians some added
leverage in future negotiations.1
The first protests and counter-protests occurred in late September 2000. In the first weeks of the
uprising scenes of Israeli soldiers using lethal force against Palestinian civilian demonstrators “framed”
the conflict as an Occupation army trampling on the rights of a civilian population to audiences go
global audience. Images of indiscriminate IDF violence against Palestinians quickly became

1
In the decade since Camp David concluded unsuccessfully the range of debate on the reasons for the
talks' failure has narrowed dramatically. The Israeli produced narrative that Arafat had rejected a
generous offer because of his incorrigible desire to destroy Israel either through the repatriation of
Palestinian refugees or armed struggle has been discredited by a wealth of testimonial literature and
journalism on the topic (Finkelstein 2007).




commonplace throughout the world. In the early weeks of the intifada the ratio of Palestinians to
Israelis killed was 20:1 and in most documented cases of Palestinian fatalities Israeli soldiers fired
without themselves being in danger (Finkelstein 2005: 97).
Yasser Arafat and Fatah expected to benefit from the intifada but were unable to conceive of
strategic direction for it. Yezid Sayigh writes that Arafat’s “management [of the revolt] has been
marked by a high degree of improvisation and short-termism” (2001: 47). As a consequence the
ordinary Palestinian population was especially vulnerable to Israeli repression. This is in marked
contrast to the dynamics of the first intifada when Palestinian labor, communal and educational
institutions worked in concert with the Palestinian national leadership within the OPT to maximize the
revolt’s effect by sending a twofold message: that the uprising was a non-violent gesture; and that
Palestinians were willing to accept a two-state solution. Interestingly, the spontaneous expressions of
labor and other communal groups were also consistent with this message. The shift in protest tactics
from popular mobilization in first intifada to militarized insurgency in the second, reflect Arafat and
Fatah’s distrust of grassroots Palestinian democracy.
Charmaine Seitz explains that in the context of substantial loss of life and a confused national
leadership, “Palestinian civil society activists in the West Bank in particular began to examine new
ways to participate in the uprising that would not get demonstrators killed” (2003: 54). The conclusion
that these activists drew was that an international presence in the OPT could potentially restrain Israel’s
counter-intifada. The first wave of transnational solidarity with the Palestinians to emerge during the
second intifada was primarily concerned with drawing attention to the violence of Israel’s counterintifada and providing security for Palestinian civilians under the threat of Israeli aggression.
The Christian Peace Makers Team (CPT) in Hebron, Women in Black and Olive Tree Summer
serve as prominent examples of non-Palestinian groups present in Occupied Palestine and Israel before
the second intifada. Members of these groups acted as witnesses and human shields for Palestinians as
well as intermediaries between the Palestinians and transnational activist networks. The tactics that




these early risers applied became central to the work of Grassroots International Protection for the
Palestinian People (GIPP), which was founded by Palestinian civil society groups and international
delegations in May 2001. By May of 2002 over 2000 foreign supporters of the Palestinians, mostly
from Europe, had visited the occupied territories as part of GIPP missions in order to distribute aid and
protect Palestinians from the IDF (Struck 2002: 62-65). In summer of 2001 a similar group, the
International Solidarity Movement (ISM) was founded by Ghassan Adoni (Palestinian), George N.
Rishmawi (Palestinian). Neta Golan (Israeli) and Huwaida Arraf (Palestinian-American).
The rise and decline of the International Solidarity Movement
The Palestinian Solidarity Movement was formed out of the struggle between Palestinians, Israelis and
internationals to provide physical protection for Palestinian civilians suffering under Israel’s counterintifada. Andoni and Rishmawi were leaders of the Center for Rapprochement Between People, based
in the West Bank town of Bayt Sahur. In 1989, the organization mobilized a 45 daylong tax-strike in
the town under the famous slogan of the American Revolution, “no taxation without representation”
(Seitz 2003: 54; Rishmawi and Golan 2004; Adoni, Qubbaj, Rishmawi and Saffold 2003: 65). Arraf
had worked at the Israeli-Palestinian program of the international dialogue project Seeds of Peace (as
did Adam Shapiro, a prominent member who joined ISM shortly after its founding) before leaving the
group to dedicate himself to activism.
The ISM concluded that the best way to achieve its goals would be to replicate the actions of
CPT and GIPP on a much larger scale and to put an increased emphasis on broadcasting their message
to the international community. Founder George Rishmawi explains, “Our goal is to help Palestinians
do non-violent resistance because when they do it without international accompaniment they are met
with terrible violence.” (Rishmawi and Golan 2004: 7). The ISM restricted its actions to non-violent
modes of resistance but made explicit that out of principle it would not dictate to Palestinians that they
should totally reject violent actions nor would it intervene in internal Palestinian politics by offering
preferential support to specific parties or movements. The group’s founders also came to a consensus




that Palestinians should be in charge of the group.
The organization’s first major operation, “Freedom Summer 2001” aimed to bring thousands of
internationals to the West Bank in order to act as a buffer between Palestinians and the IDF. The
“Freedom Summer” fell far short of the ISM’s aspirations. While preparing for the campaign ISM
members found that many Palestinians in the al- Khadir village of the West Bank where the group
planned on establishing a tent of human shields were suspicious that the organization had an ulterior
motive to displace Palestinian resistance. Furthermore, some Palestinians also objected to the
involvement of the Israeli citizens in direct action within Palestine (Seitz 2005: 56). Ultimately, only
between 50-80 internationals joined the movement. However, the campaign did succeed in executing
direct actions such as marching on checkpoints and guarding Palestinians as they removed IDF
roadblocks.
In December 2001, the ISM launched its second campaign in the Occupied Palestinian territories,
which mirrored the actions of the “Freedom Summer.” In March 2002, Israel launched Operation
Defensive Shield and sent armed troops to re-occupy parts of the West Bank that it had granted to the
Palestinian Authority such as Ramallah and Jenin. Operation Defensive Shield prevented the ISM from
carrying out its planned third mission to the West Bank but by increasing the violence in the OPT it
drew attention to the ISM’s work. One assessment of the group explains that it was during this period
when,
the ISM really hit its stride. With every West Bank town save Jericho invaded and placed under
draconian curfew, and with thousands of Palestinians being arrested and processed through
detention camps, ISM suddenly found itself in a position to do lifesaving work (Seitz 2005: 57).

During this period two events in particular raised the profile of the ISM. The first occurred in
early April 2002 when ISM participants along with internationals from other (mostly Europeans
associated with GIPP) solidarity groups and medical personal marched past the ring of Israeli tanks and
into Yasser Arafat’s Presidential Compound (the Muqata’a) in Ramallah. The presence of these




activists reduced Israeli gunfire on the compound, possibly prevented the assassination of Arafat and
added pressure on the IDF to let food, water and medical supplies cross the siege. The second major
event was the murder of ISM member Rachel Corrie, an American citizen and a student at Evergreen
College, by the IDF on 16 March 2003. Corrie was killed while protecting Palestinian homes and land
in southern Gaza from IDF bulldozers that were demolishing properties of civilians and militants alike
in order to create a buffer zone between the Gaza Strip and the Egyptian Sinai. ISM members have
provided eyewitness accounts explaining how Corrie was deliberately attacked by an IDF bulldozer
(Finkelstein 2005: 120). However, the Israeli government maintains that her death was an accident.
The death of Rachel Corrie brought attention to the ISM’s activism and temporarily increased its
influence but it was also a major event in the group’s undoing. The ISM had hoped that by sending
internationals to a conflict zone it could deter the IDF from indiscriminately using force. It also hoped
that foreign government’s would intervene on behalf of their imperiled citizens in the ISM and pressure
Israel to restrain its violent counter-intifada. In many cases the ISM successfully disrupted IDF
violence, delivered humanitarian assistance to Palestinians, and amassed international pressure on the
IDF to free Palestinian prisoners.
By winter 2002, the ISM had become increasingly aware that the IDF could not be counted on to
spare the lives of Palestinians because of the presence of international activists. By this time the
activists themselves were increasingly under attack by the Israeli army and the American Consulate in
Israel would not take responsibility to secure the physical safety of its citizens in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories (Shaik 2003). Beginning in Summer 2003 Israel started placing increased
restrictions on international solidarity activists. The official Israeli policy became to prohibit
international activists from entering the OPT and many participants who were in the territories were
deported. Both the ISM and the CPT have had their offices raided and their files and computers





confiscated by the IDF.2
The combination of an increasingly repressive IDF, lack of support from foreign governments for
its work and the difficulties of organizing in occupied Palestine presented the ISM with a strategic
crisis. The ISM currently maintains a presence in the OPT but its greatest effect is felt outside of
Palestine. Current and former ISM members have used the relationships they built with Palestinian
activists during their stays in the territories to foster connections between solidarity groups and
Palestinian communities, which have been an important factor of the BDS campaign. ISM participants
regularly speak in the US and Europe about their experiences in Palestine. The ISM continues to send
delegations to the Occupied Territories and takes part in actions against the West Bank Wall, the siege
of Gaza and on behalf of Palestinians threatened by military or settler violence. However, the group no
longer commands the public attention that it once did.

The Origins of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) Movement
From the start of the second intifada international activists experimented with boycotts, divestment
campaigns and other forms of commercial and cultural sanctions against Israel. In many cases, the
inspiration for this tactic came from the example of transnational resistance to apartheid rule, which
pressured schools, banks, governments and athletic institutions to stop doing business with the racist
state in South Africa. In August-September of 2001, an NGO declaration at the Durban Conference
against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance labeled Israel an

2
The ISM also made mistakes of its own that hindered its reputation with Palestinians and international
activists. In May 2002, the ISM recreated its entry into the Muqata’a by joining Palestinians within the
besieged Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. The delegation provided aid and increased international
attention on Israel’s siege of the historic city. However, after Palestinians and Israelis had reached a
deal to evacuate the Church and relieve the pressure on Bethlehem the ISM inadvertently prolonged the
siege by refusing to leave unless they were guaranteed by Israel that their members in the Church
would not be deported from the West Bank. Understandably, the move caused friction among
Palestinians who saw their suffering prolonged by the ISM’s choice (Seitz 2005: 58-59). Many also
feel that by inserting itself in Palestinian villages, the ISM placed unfair burdens on Palestinian
communities who are asked to feed and house the activists.




“apartheid state” and called for the international community to marginalize it.
Frances A. Boyle, a professor of law at the University of Illinois, launched the first movement
for campus divestment from Israel in November 2000. Around the same time, a parallel campaign was
launched by the group Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) at the University of California Berkeley
that circulated a petition asking the school to reconsider the estimated $6.4 billion that it has invested
with companies in sizeable business relationship with Israel. By March 2003, the document had over
6,000 student signatures. A joint divestment campaign by students at Harvard University and
Massachusetts Institute of Technology divestment campaign received the support of prominent faculty
members such as Noam Chomsky and well publicized criticism from Harvard’s Dean Lawrence
Summers. By 2004, solidarity groups on over 40 US campuses had launched divestment campaigns. In
addition to attracting a significant amount of media attention and furthering the comparison between
Israel and apartheid South Africa, this first generation of the campus divestment movement succeeded
in organizing a divestment conference at UC Berkeley and producing a widely circulated handbook on
divestment that continues to be used by activists (Aladin 2003; Sbaihat 2005).
In July 2004, the general assembly of the Presbyterian Church USA (PCUSA) overwhelming
voted in favor of a policy of “corporate engagement” potentially including selective divestment from
corporations profiting from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The resolution was informed by a recent trip
to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian territories by PCUSA congregants who returned to the United
States horrified by the privations and the hardships brought about by Israel’s West Bank Wall. In
August 2005 PCUSA identified Caterpillar, ITT Industries, Motorola, Citigroup and United
Technologies as five corporations whose business practices in Palestine-Israel put innocent lives in
danger. The Anglican Peace and Justice Network, the World Council of Churches, the United
Methodist Church, the Evangelical and Lutheran Church in America and the United Church of Christ
all of which passed decisions to explore selective divestment followed the Presbyterians.
In Europe, interest in an academic boycott of Israel has been steadily growing since April of




2002. The campaign for an academic boycott of Israel in Europe began mainstreamed by Hillary Rose
and Steven Rose in an April 2002 in the London Guardian calling on European academic institutions,
at both the national and regional level to stop providing support to Israeli institutions, until Israel meets
its obligations under international law and opens peace negotiations with the Palestinians (Rose and
Rose 2002; Rose and Rose 2008). The letter was signed by 120 European academics.
The most significant result of these early BDS campaigns was to demonstrate to Palestinian
leaders that making a global BDS movement, similar to the one launched against South African
Apartheid was a possibility, even if its chances for success were uncertain. In July 2004, the Palestinian
Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) issued a statement of principles
urging their peers in other countries to boycott Israeli academic and cultural institutions until the state
of Israel ends its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, assented to UN resolutions pertaining to
refugee rights, and ends its discriminatory practices against the Palestinians. PACBI argued that Israeli
schools and universities play numerous roles in “maintaining, defending or justifying” the oppression
of the Palestinians “or have been complicit through their silence” (PACBI 2004) Over 60 academic,
cultural, labor and political Palestinian civil society groups have endorsed the resolution. PACBI
frequently selects protest targets against which local solidarity groups design specific campaigns. For
example, in the summer of 2009, groups throughout the United States and Europe protested the
musician Leonard Cohen’s concerts on the basis that his world tour included a show in Tel Aviv.
In the period immediately after PACBI’s call was issued, organizations throughout the world
continued to press for a BDS movement against Israel. In October 2004 the Congress of South African
Trade Unions (COSATU) and other South African organizations issued a joint declaration calling for a
boycott of Israel. In May 2006 COATSU voted to endorse the PACBI resolution. The US based
National Lawyers Guild, a historically progressive legal group voted to endorse divestment campaigns
until Israel fulfilled its obligations to the Palestinians under international law (Murray 2008: 142143).
On 9 July 2005, building off of the momentum of the PACBI initiative and the worldwide




support for BDS, 170 Palestinian civil society organizations within Palestine issued a call for a global
BDS campaign against Israel. The statement reads:
In view of the fact that people of conscience in the international community have historically
shouldered the moral responsibility to fight injustice, as exemplified in the struggle to abolish
apartheid in South Africa through diverse forms of boycott, divestment and sanctions; and
Inspired by the struggle of South Africans against apartheid and in the spirit of international
solidarity, moral consistency and resistance to injustice and oppression;
We, representatives of Palestinian civil society, call upon international civil society organizations
and people of conscience all over the world to impose broad boycotts and implement divestment
initiatives against Israel similar to those applied to South Africa in the apartheid era. We appeal to
you to pressure your respective states to impose embargoes and sanctions against Israel. We also
invite conscientious Israelis to support this Call, for the sake of justice and genuine peace.
(Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National Committee 2005)
The parallel between the 2005 call from Palestinian Civil Society for a global BDS campaign
against Israel and the comparison with anti-Apartheid BDS movement was sharpened by the one year
anniversary of the International Court of Justice’s landmark ruling that Israel’s wall though the West
Bank violated international law and thus had to be dismantled. The movement against Apartheid was
similarly emboldened by a 1971 International Court of Justice ruling against South Africa’s violations
of international law in Namibia, which reinforced its demand for South Africa to be treated like a rogue
state (Murray 2008: 141).
The 2005 call from Palestinian Civil Society for a BDS campaign against Israel represents a
major escalation from earlier attempts to foster a BDS movement. The call itself put greater stress on
the West Bank Wall, international law and the analogy between Israel’s policies and the state-racism of
apartheid South Africa than previous attempts to mobilize shame against Israel. The mass support that
the declaration brought from Palestinian organizations gave it credibility with foreign activists worried
about imposing an agenda on the Palestinians or being insufficiently attentive to Palestinian voices.
The BDS movement has also created a number of prominent Palestinian personalities. The bestknown figure is Omar Barghouti, a founding member of PACBI and an international spokesperson for
the academic and cultural boycott of Israel. Jamal Juma, a coordinator for the Grassroots Anti




Apartheid Wall Campaign speaks regularly in Europe about the injustices that the Wall brings upon
Palestinians who lose access their homes, jobs, farmlands, hospitals and family members because of its
presence. The Grass Roots Anti Apartheid Wall Campaign formed in 2002 and is comprised of
representatives from communities that are directly affected by the Wall and Palestinian NGO’s. The
group coordinates protest strategies between communities and conducts outreach to the international
community by speaking at conferences, sending representatives on speaking tours, publishing
information on the Wall and bringing non-Palestinians to villages affected by the Wall to witness its
impact and participate in protests against it.
In late 2009 and early 2010 Juma received international attention after being arrested by the
IDF during an arrest campaign against West Bank anti-Wall and BDS activists. Mohammad Othman, a
native of Jayyous in the West Bank, also received international media attention when he was detained
without charge by Israel in September 2009. Othman was returning from Norway, which had recently
terminated its public pension’s investments in the Israeli military contractor Elbit, where he was
speaking with government officials about the situation in the OPT and other ways in which the country
could make ethical investment decisions regarding Palestine-Israel. The arrests of Juma and Othman
made two already visible activists even more prominent within the BDS movement.
The call for BDS energized existing attempts to replicate the anti-apartheid repertoire and
inspired new local movements. Since its declaration, the call has become the strategic and political
linchpin of a global movement that is highly decentralized, non-hierarchical and increasingly
successful in the past year. In the next section I provide a general outline of the history of one of the
most prominent and influential US based groups in the BDS movement, Adalah. Adalah is responsible
for bringing attention to Israel diamond magnate Lev Leviev’s construction of illegal Israeli settlements
in the West Bank and for pressuring respected international organizations such as OXFAM and
UNICEF to distance themselves from Leviev.





Adalah3
In 2005, Omar Barghouti visited New York City to meet with local solidarity activists from the ISM,
Jews Against the Occupation, Al-Awda the Right of Return Coalition, the International Socialist
Organization, New York University and Columbia University to discuss organizing a BDS campaign in
the city. Participants in this meeting formed the New York BDS Campaign. Through 2005 and 2006,
the New York BDS Campaign made limited strides in building a BDS movement. The group’s first
action occurred during Israel’s summer 2006 invasion of Lebanon when the groups organized
demonstrations outside of Israeli coffee shop chain Aroma Café’s Houston Street location. These
protests were carried out with minimal preparation and lasted for roughly a month. Participants admit
that the decision to protest Aroma Café was chosen quickly and without a strategic assessment of its
consequences.
Over the next year, the New York City BDS Campaign worked within the Ad Hoc Committee
for Middle East Justice, an umbrella organization of New York City antiwar, peace, and leftwing
groups that had united to keep awareness of the Palestinian issue alive within New York City and to
organize relevant groups around a solidarity strategy. The Committee did not undertake any major
BDS efforts. It did however organize demonstrations against the IDF’s policies in the Gaza Strip and
act as reminder within the New York anti-war movement of the links between the Palestinian question
and the US war in Iraq.
In the summer of 2007, the Committee underwent a major internal assessment of its identity,
objectives and role. Members of the committee concluded that they were in fact no longer an “ad hoc”
organization but a stable group and that they would like to spend more of their resources on developing
a BDS campaign in New York City. The group changed its name to Adalah, which means “justice” in
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Arabic, and underwent a nearly three month long process researching potential targets for BDS
campaigns.
The organization decided to target the businesses of Lev Leviev and Shaya Boymelgreen, two
Israeli businessmen with significant financial and ideological investments in the expansion of Israeli
settlements. Leviev is an Israeli diamond magnate whose is famous for breaking the DeBeers
company’s monopoly on diamond exports from Southern Africa. He is the owner of Africa- Israel
Investments a real-estate company working to expand Israeli settlements in the OPT. His company has
substantial investments in the settlements of Modi’in Illit, which is built on land taken from the
Palestinian village of Bil’in. When Adalah’s campaign began, Shaya Boymelgreen worked closely with
Leviev in both the West Bank and New York City. In 2002, they formed the real estate company
Leviev Boymelgreen that built and developed properties in Manhattan and Brooklyn. In the West
Bank, Boymelgreen’s company, The Green Park Project, subcontracted one of Leviev’s companies to
build in Modi’in Illit. Leviev figured more prominently than Boymelgreen in Adalah’s activism
because he was opening a diamond store bearing his name in midtown Manhattan and because human
rights and labor groups have criticized his relationship with the Angolan government.
When Adalah was preparing to launch its campaign, Leviev and Boymelgreen were already
facing criticisms from the New York City Laborers Union for substandard labor practices. Adalah
reached out to the laborers union and planned on working closely with them in a joint campaign against
Leviev and Boymelgreen, the settlements in the West Bank and labor issues in New York City.
However, the Laborers Union reached an agreement with Leviev and Boymelgreen and Adalah was left
without their support. Thus, Adalah’s first campaign against Leviev concentrated heavily on his
financing of Israeli settlements in the OPT, while making some mentions of his relationship with the
Angolan government and his record of conflicts with organized labor. In fall and winter 2007 Adalah
began to protest in front of Leviev’s Manhattan store. The group also reached out to celebrity endorsers
of Leviev’s diamonds such as Susan Sarandon but was unable to elicit public responses from them.




It is important to note that the idea to launch BDS actions against Leviev came from
Palestinian and Israeli activists involved in direct action against the Wall in the West Bank. Residents
of the towns of Jayyous and Bil’in, both of which lose substantial amount of their lands to the Wall,
have been holding regular protests against the barrier for the past five years. In addition to organizing
demonstrations members of the popular committees of these towns and members of the Grassroots
Anti-Wall Campaign and Anarchists Against the Wall (AATW) conduct detailed research on Israel's
settlement plans for the areas East of the Wall and the construction and real estate firms that build the
settlements. Activists in Bil’in and Jayyous discovered that Leviev and Boymelgreen's companies were
major player in settlement construction in these areas. The connection between Bil’in and Jayyous and
Adalah in New York City was made through members of the ISM and AATW who before joining the
Ad Hoc Committee spent time in these villages (especially Jayyous) and built strong relationships with
activists there. Members of Adalah emphasize that if it were not for the research of the Popular
Committees for Bil’in and Jayyous their organization would probably not have realized the extent of
Leviev and Boymelgreen's involvement in settlement construction.
The campaign against Leviev's diamond business quickly became one of the most ubiquitous
BDS actions. Leviev's spokespeople responded to Adalah by touting their figurehead's history of
philanthropy and pointed to his contributions to UNICEF and OXFAM International as examples.
Adalah reacted by asking these organizations how they could accept donations from a settlement
builder with a history of objectionable relations with the Angolan government without violating their
own conditions for donors. UNICEF responded to Adalah’s inquiry by stating that it would no longer
accept contributions from Leviev and explained that it had only received donations “indirectly” from
Leviev who had contributed to events for the group that were organized by the French magazine Gala.
(Adalah 2008b).
An OXFAM representative publicly responded that in fact Leviev had never donated to the
organization and that it does not “knowingly accept funds from any business involved in any illegal




activity, or operating in any illegally occupied territory, including settlements in the occupied
Palestinian territories.” (Adalah 2008a) These actions received a significant amount of media attention.
Videos of Adalah protesting in front of Leviev’s Manhattan store became a small viral sensation on
solidarity and leftwing listservs and websites. The campaign and the statements from UNICEF and
OXFAM were covered by a wide range of media organizations including Haaretz, the Jerusalem Post,
the Jewish Daily Forward, the Jewish Week, the New York Post and numerous diamond industry trade
journals.
At the Hampshire College BDS Conference in November 2009, an Adalah member Daniel
Strum explained the group’s approach to Leviev as follows: “You look for a target. And you look for a
target that has hooks…You research it and it starts to look like a web with a target at the center” (Strum
and El-Kadi 2009). Adalah and other solidarity groups have targeted other institutions associated with
Africa-Israel. In Norway the investment firm Blackrock divested from Africa-Israel in result from a
campaign critical of the company’s human rights record in the OPT and Angola. The British Embassy
in Tel Aviv backed out of a plan to rent a building owned by the company in response to arguments
that it would be improper to do business with a settlement builder. In these and other cases Adalah has
provided a model to other activists and supplied resources on Africa-Israel’s involvement in settlement
construction, its impact on Palestinian communities and its status under international law.
One of Adalah’s most lasting effects has been to convince other groups that BDS is a viable
political strategy. In 2009, the feminist antiwar group CODEPINK launched a boycott against the
Israeli cosmetics company Ahava on the grounds that it uses resources and owns land in the West
Bank. A lot of the information in CODEPINK’s campaign has come from research Adalah had
collected on Ahava. CODEPINK also followed Adalah’s example and targeted celebrity endorsers of
Ahava just as Leviev’s famous spokespeople were targeted.

2: Comparative Analysis




What does the political opportunity framework have to offer the study of solidarity movements and
their outcomes? What does it tell us about how foreign policy is made in the United States?
Scholarship on the American solidarity movements for East Timor and Central America reports that at
certain points solidarity did influence the procedures and policies of US foreign policy. However,
comparative questions about the relationship between political opportunity and the impact of solidarity
movements on US foreign policy remain largely unaddressed. This chapter argues that the variations in
strategies and outcomes of these past solidarity movements are to a great extent determined by the
variations in political opportunities. However, these opportunities are not currently in effect nor will
they be available in the foreseeable future for the Palestine solidarity movement.
This argument is explicated along three closely related lines in the course of my discussion of
these movements. First, this chapter analyzes the core thesis of the political opportunity framework that
the presence of elite allies is a crucial factor affecting movement strategy and the ability of movements
to effect political outcomes. The evidence demonstrates that in the cases studied access to and support
of elite actors such as elected politicians, party leaders and members of government is crucial to
movement success. Second, political opportunities should be analyzed as particular ‘configurations’
(Schock 1999; Tarrow 1996). The effect of one dimension of political opportunity is highly dependent
on other dimensions and it these combinations of openings and closings that determine the trajectory
and impact of movements. Third, solidarity activists have their greatest impact when the strategic
efficacy of the US relationship with a third world client is in doubt. For example, solidarity with East
Timor registered its greatest successes after the Cold War ended and Indonesia lost its utility as an antiCommunist ally while the inability of Suharto’s regime to maintain order in Indonesia proper and East
Timor forced US policy makers to consider the possibility that their objectives may be better served by
allowing democratic transitions in these countries.





How Movements Matter
Social movements aspire to change public policy; but the relationship between movements and
observable policy changes has been a relatively neglected field in social movement research compared
to the study of the emergence and trajectory of particular movements (Giungi 1998). Recently,
however, the study of social movement outcomes has received increased scholarly attention (Gingui
1998; Giungi 1999; Meyer 1999) and clarified some of the methodological and theoretical problems
that have stood in the way of a systematic understanding. This section reviews and synthesizes some of
this work in order to clarify the relevant methodological and theoretical issues involved in this chapter.
To examine the influence of solidarity movements it is useful to first identify the types of
effects that activism can have on US foreign policy. Kitschelt’s (1986) insight that movement impacts
should be broken down into procedural, substantive and structural change is useful to our study. For a
social movement, being able to influence the procedure of policy-making by introducing its ideas into
an agenda, making the government justify its policies to the public and by changing who makes policy
represent significant achievements. This reinforces Meyer’s warning against the trap of seeing policymaking as a “black box, described without nuance and contingency” (2003: 5). Substantive impacts
refer to the actual policies of state and imply a procedural change. Legislation suspending military
and/or economic assistance, restricting diplomatic ties or conditioning a bilateral relationship on
improvements in its human rights record are all examples of substantive impacts solidarity movements
have made. Structural impacts involve long-term changes in the constellation of institutional channels
that make policy. The Vietnam anti-war movement joined with political elites and members of
Congress to have a democratizing effect on the structure of foreign policy-making that required that the
military parts of the state apparatuses responsible for foreign policy (CIA, National Security Council,
Pentagon) and the executive become increasingly accountable to the supervision of the Congress.
Legislation such as the War Powers Act, The Freedom of Information Act and the creation of




intelligence oversight committees in the House and the Senate are effects of structural change brought
about in part by anti-Vietnam War mobilization (Blackman and Sharpe 1986). Unlike the anti-Vietnam
war movement, the movements studied in this paper have not resulted in structural changes in the US
political system; and their effects for policy are limited to the procedural and substantive.
Since our interest is in the causal relationship between solidarity movements and foreign policy,
it is useful to address the routes by which movement influence manifests. David Meyer argues that
social movements can influence foreign policy through three paths: “Direct and indirect influence on
state policy from within the state, direct influence on foreign governments, and indirect influence on
foreign governments by alliance with movements in other countries” (1999: 188).
American solidarity movements typically view the military-diplomatic relationship that the US
has with a client as their most effective lever to change a situation because of the dominance of the US
in international politics and the relative openness of its political system. Solidarity movements have
attempted to directly influence US foreign policy by bringing issues to the attention of elites, proposing
policy alternatives, mobilizing constituent pressure against policy choices, launching disruptive actions
to increase the cost of policy options and to indirectly effect policy by appealing to public opinion by
re-framing issues to highlight resonate political or moral themes, pressuring corporations, schools and
cultural institutions to terminate their relationships with foreign actors.
Solidarity movements can also indirectly affect US foreign policy through their relationships
with groups in other countries. Ideas, frames and tactics are diffused between the first and third worlds
in what Clifford Bob refers to as the “marketing of rebellion” (2001). Solidarity activists can help their
allies frame their message in resonant ways for the consumption of the United Nations, transnational
nongovernmental organizations, foreign publics, activist constituencies and US elites. They can also
give an advantage to certain tactics and strategies in insurgent repertories by bringing them increased
international attention as well as funding and logistical support. This is part of the larger project of
framing processes and perception management that movements participate in.




Political Opportunities, Movement Strategies and Outcomes
Recent scholarship on social movements has proposed looking at movements through a “political
process model” that filters and mediates internal aspects of particular movements such as strategy and
mobilizing structure through the field of political opportunities. This approach emerged as a response
to an earlier emphasis in social movement research on movement tactics argued that that the particular
set of tactics employed by movements was the determinant of political outcomes. This project
produced contradictory findings on the effects of internal characteristics (Giungi 1998: 374-379) and
scholars have increasingly recognized the role of political environment in the emergence, trajectory and
outcomes of social movements. An emphasis on the dimensions of political opportunity, rather than
internal variables, is more useful here since solidarity movements employ very similar strategies, but
gain very different results from their efforts.
The political opportunity framework has been criticized from various angles, but two arguments
in particular cut to the core of the potential shortcomings of the concept. First, an emphasis on political
opportunity structure can lead to invariant causal models that negate cultural and historical specificity
of movements and their contexts (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). Second, political opportunity can
become a fuzzy category of analysis that does not specify what political contexts are relevant to the
mobilization and outcomes of solidarity movements and how this influence works (Meyer and Minkoff
2004; McAdam 1996).
Addressing these problems is useful for our discussion of the solidarity movements. First,
because these movements all operate primarily within the US’ ‘open’ political system, because the high
points of their mobilization all occurred in the aftermath of the US invasion of Vietnam when Congress
and public opinion enjoyed an unprecedentedly important role in foreign policy-making and because
they share the same objective of eroding US support for a rogue state, it makes sense to consider the
same factors across cases. By placing these movements in a comparative arrangement this work is




concerned with explaining and understanding the generalizeable logic at work across cases. Second, the
dimensions of opportunity that I apply in this chapter are in general regarded as core factors of a
political environment for social movements in Democratic states: elite allies/divided governments,
oppositions, media coverage; implementation capacity; and international contexts of political
opportunities. In the following paragraphs, I justify the application of these factors to the study of
solidarity movements.
For anti-imperialist movements, the presence of significant elite allies is typically coterminous
with divisions within government. Disagreements among elites signal to activists that they may be able
to find support from within policy-making institutions for their goals. Divisions within government
may also encourage elites to make alliances with challengers as a source of leverage against opponents.
Ultimately, solidarity movements are dependent on alliances with elites and members of government in
order to sustain their cause in institutional forums and to translate their mobilization into policy
outcomes (Tarrow 1996).
Organized opposition includes lobbying groups, advocacy organizations, counter movements,
coercive or repressive measures and policy-making blocs. These parties work to hinder the ability of
social movements to voice their grievance and bargain with elites. This can happen through explicit
efforts such as assembling reactionary constituencies, discursively delegitimizing challengers, policing
activist groups and/or buying influence with Congress. Opposition can also be effective when it takes
on ambiguous forms. Counter movements and agents of opposition attempt to destabilize the dramatic
and simple injustice frames that challengers need as mobilizing devices (Mcadam 1982: 215).
Media coverage is not typically included as a dimension of political opportunity in case studies
of movements occurring in democratic countries, although scholars regularly point to the effects of free
flows of information on the emergence, mobilization and outcomes of insurgencies in authoritarian
states (Schock 1999; Fish 1996). However, although activists have the freedom to communicate
amongst themselves, it should not simply be assumed that the press in democratic societies will provide




the critical accounts of foreign policy that activists require. In many cases coverage of important issues
is constrained by and imitates official sources making the task of framing issues much more difficult
for social movements (McCarthy, Smith and Zald 1998). Alternatively, high levels of media coverage
can help activists mobilize large numbers of people—as was the case for the Central American peace
movement. This can also provoke counter-movements or introduce them into a debate under the ethic
of balanced coverage (Meyer and Staggenbord 1996: 1642). Finally, social movements are likely to
influence the legislative process when their goals are compatible with the general trends in public
opinion (Gamson and Wolsfeld 1993), which implies regular and favorable media attention.
Developments in international politics can impact domestic social movements in multiple ways.
As we have seen in our discussion of the BDS movement, activists attempt to align themselves with
international institutions and norms in order to establish their legitimacy. When policymakers face
difficult foreign policy decisions they may turn to activists and academics for advice. In this context,
the intellectual resources of a movement are of critical importance. For example, the anti-Vietnam war
movement benefited from the expertise of scholar-activists such as George Kahin who, once
policymakers began to question the viability of the war, were able to provide intellectually credible and
extensive reports on the history of Indochina that disputed the strategic and moral wisdom of US
policies. Studies of the American Civil Rights movement point to the US-Soviet rivalry as a political
opportunity that created international pressure on the US to improve its treatment of AfricanAmericans (Klotz 2002: 55).

Imperialism and Solidarity Movements: East Timor
In December 1975, Indonesia invaded and annexed the former Portuguese colony and newly
independent nation of East Timor. The invasion took place shortly after Indonesia’s President Suharto
received a visit from Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger promising US support in the event that Jakarta
decided to invade East Timor and licensing the use of US weapons in the invasion. For most of




Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor, Washington provided arms, training and diplomatic cover at the
United Nations Security Council. During this time, Indonesia was a key Cold War ally, violently anticommunist and a favorite example in the US political discourse of the virtues of economic
liberalization.
In East Timor, the Freitlin Party, a social democratic movement that fought the Indonesian
backed Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) in a civil war prior to the invasion, retreated to East
Timor’s mountainous interior and fought Indonesia in a guerrilla war. Freitlin was poorly armed and
not well enough trained to fight the NATO-backed Indonesian army. Only Indonesia’s faulty
preparation allowed the fighting to ebb and flow until the end of the decade. During this period tens of
thousands of East Timorese were displaced as a consequence of intensive aerial bombardment and a
third of the population died from either disease, famine or fighting (Anderson 1998: 133-134; Kammen
2001).

In the US the invasion provoked resistance from a small but determined collection of antiwar
activists, journalists, academics, Portuguese-Americans, antiwar protesters and Catholic activists
(Simpson 2004: 456). Despite having a relatively small number of participants the solidarity movement
for East Timor found important intellectual resources in Benedict Anderson, an Indonesia expert at
Cornell University and a group of students, notably Arnold Kohen, conducted extensive research into
the situation in Timor, published regular newsletters, lobbied politicians, reached out to the media and
built bridges between activists. These efforts, however, only made a minimal impact on a public that
was generally ignorant of the situation in East Timor. As one participant-history of the solidarity
movement explains, “through the 1980s, in most of the world, East Timor was the quintessential,
obscure lost cause” (Scheiner 2001: 109)
By the beginning of the 1980’s, Indonesia came to believe that the East Timorese guerrillas had
been sufficiently suppressed and marginalized that they could begin incorporating East Timor into the





Indonesian polity. Jakarta’s attempts to ‘modernize’ East Timor by building urban infrastructure,
increasing literacy and encouraging East Timorese participation in the Indonesian state and economy
coexisted with a paternalistic attitude towards the East Timorese who were never considered members
of the Indonesian nation despite their empirical integration into the Indonesian state. Many of the
paternalistic measures that Indonesia applied to East Timor ostensibly to ‘advance’ it gave the country
a deeper and wider sense of national identity than had previously existed. (Anderson 1993). Freitilin
readily adapted its strategy to these changing circumstances. From the mid 1980’s onward the party
concluded that it had been defeated militarily and decided to strengthen its contacts with young
activists in the capital city of Dili and encouraged them to prepare for non-violent actions.
In November 12 1991, a funeral march towards the Santa Cruz cemetery was held for
nationalist East Timorese activists who had died in clashes with pro-integration forces two weeks
earlier. As the marchers approached the cemetery the military fired on them killing a total of 271
people in what came to be known as the “Santa Cruz Massacre” (Kammen 2001: 164). The events were
caught on film by American journalists and were widely circulated throughout the world. In response
to international concern over the massacre, Suharto dismissed the generals responsible for it. For the
first time evidence of Indonesian atrocities in East Timor was incontrovertible and widely known. The
solidarity network used graphic footage and testimonials of the counter-protest to grow its ranks and
exercise moral pressure on Indonesia’s backers in Washington and neither Indonesia nor the US could
provide a compelling justification for the occupation of East Timor. After the massacre, solidarity
activists seized the opportunity and formed larger bodies such as the East Timor Action Network
(ETAN) that gave the movement a more singular voice. By 1995, ETAN had over 10,000 supporters
(Simpson 2004: 464).
By working through Congress the movement was able to reduce US military support to Jakarta.
In 1992, ETAN initiated and won a campaign to cut a US training program for Indonesian military
officers. In 1993, ETAN convinced Congress to suspend the transfer of F-5 fighter planes to Indonesia




and in 1994, under mounting Congressional and social movement pressure the State Department issued
a ban on small arms transfers (Simpson: 460-561. By the end of the decade the US came to favor East
Timor’s independence. This change is attributable to a considerable extent to activists that had
persuaded Congress to oppose the occupation through a campaign of information politics.

Political Opportunities
Media coverage
Lack of public consciousness about the occupation proved to be the central obstacle to a more robust
solidarity campaign. East Timor was all but completely ignored by the mainstream media until the
early 1990s (Chomsky and Herman 1979). Without a greater public awareness of the atrocities being
committed in East Timor solidarity activists in the US could not draw on the reserves of moral outrage
that filled the mass mobilizations on behalf of Central America and South African blacks. Knowledge
about Timor was thwarted by a double censorship. First, the Indonesian annexation made it extremely
difficult to get a consistent flow of reliable information out of East Timor. Accounts of atrocities came
from infrequent electronic communications from nationalist guerrillas, refugees who had resettled in
Australia or Portugal, exiles and the Catholic Church in Timor. Until 1989, international journalists
that visited the country were managed by the Indonesian military and their accounts reflected the
interests of their minders. Second, the American media gave almost no coverage to the invasion and
occupation of East Timor. When news outlets did report on the situation, they typically gave deference
to the accounts of Indonesian generals, which portrayed Jakarta’s invasion as an intervention to halt
intra-Timorese violence and to displace Freitlin’s “Marxists” proto-state.
The absence of mainstream media coverage of the events in Timor forced activists to gather and
disseminate information through their own channels. In 1991, when Indonesia temporarily opened up
East Timor to foreign observers, American journalists Amy Goodman, Allan Nairn, Max Stahl and
Steve Cox seized the opportunity and went to East Timor. During their mission they attended the
protest at the Santa Cruz cemetery, which was violently repressed by the Indonesian military and




resulted in the deaths of 271 people. The video, photographs and testimonials provided by these
journalists “distilled the brutality of East Timor into a single graphic event for the international mass
media. Cut into sound bites, screened repeatedly around the world” including on the CBS evening
news (Hill 2002: 32).
The historical significance of the Santa Cruz massacre is inextricably intertwined with the
politics of its representation. The footage reinvigorated the solidarity movement for East Timor, which
shortly thereafter formed the East Timor Action Network (ETAN/US). The US media’s lack of East
Timor coverage made ETAN and its affiliates one of the few sources of information available on East
Timor. The group expanded on its precursors’ commitment to independent media by producing a
popular newsletter and using listerservs and websites as parallel news sources.
Divided government and elite allies
East Timor was met with general indifference from Congress. This was the result of general ignorance
about the situation and calculated strategies from within the US government to suppress information
about the human rights abuses occurring in East Timor. For example, a 1958 US-Indonesian agreement
prohibited Jakarta from using American supplied arms outside of its borders. State Department reports
on human rights abuses in East Timor regularly elided Jakarta’s violations or offered apologia for
Indonesia’s ‘improving’ commitment to human rights. During this period the US provided close to one
billion dollars in aid to Jakarta. In 1977, when Indonesia requested OV-10 bronco counter-insurgency
airplanes the Carter administration covertly provided them while assuring Congress that an embargo on
military transfers was being honored (Anderson 1998: 133).
Opposition
Suharto’s Indonesia never developed a strong lobby in Washington. The absence of a large Indonesian
community prevented the state from developing a social base in America. Furthermore, until the 1990s
when the authority of the military government began to visibly erode there was no need for any
additional force to guide US policy towards Indonesia, which enjoyed stable support from corporate
interests, the diplomatic corps and both political parties.




When the Santa Cruz Massacres brought increased attention to Indonesia, solidarity activists
found they were the main organized voice petitioning Congress on the issue and, in the words of one
historian, “persuaded many Congressional offices with just a few visits, phone calls or constituents
letters” (Simpson 2004: 464). Consequently, a core part of ETAN’s strategy involved communication
with the State Department, the White House and Congress. In 1994, as criticism of Suharto’s regime
and the occupation of East Timor intensified, business and diplomatic elites interested in “downplaying
human-rights abuses, and bolstering U.S. commercial, diplomatic, and military support for Suharto”
(Press 1997) formed the United States-Indonesia society to lobby Congress and the Clinton
Administration.
International factors
The post-Cold War situation offered an array of expanding international opportunities to the East
Timorese nationalist movement and its transnational allies. The collapse of the Soviet Union denied the
US its main rationale for supporting Suharto’s regime which after decades-long attempts at state and
nation-building faced major domestic legitimization problems from civil society activists and a
rebellion in the Ache province. While the Clinton administration initially maintained US foreign
policy’s embrace of Suharto, as his government’s problems multiplied Washington lost reasons to
maintain him in power. Furthermore, the crisis besetting Jakarta was an opportunity for the East
Timorese to escalate their nationalist mobilization.

Imperialism and Solidarity Movements: Central America
For most of the 1970s Central America, like Indonesia, was an example of stability in the US’ global
strategy of constructing client regimes in the Third World. US weapons, monetary aid and military
training subsidized oligarchic systems in Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador that rested on an
alliance between the armed forces and the landowning elite. These states did not seek out popular
legitimacy, which would have required social welfare and land distribution policies. During the 1970s





coalitions of progressive Catholics, Marxist rebels and union organizers slowly gathered the capacity
and popular support to challenge these regimes. By 1979, Nicaragua’s Somoza dynasty had been
overturned by a Marxist guerrilla force known as the Sandinistas. El Salvador was engulfed in a brutal
civil war between the military and a Catholic-Marxist joint opposition; Guatemala had disintegrated
into civil war. The Reagan administration declared Central America one of the most important geostrategic areas in the world and threatened a direct US invasion of the region (Lafeber 1993: 278-280)
The most important groups in the US Central America peace movement were Sanctuary,
Witness for Peace and the Pledge of Resistance. Sanctuary was started in response to the Department of
Immigration Naturalization Services’ (INS) refusal to grant asylum to Central American refugees. It
helped displaced Central Americans circumvent INS roadblocks, navigate the desert terrain and found
them shelter in places of worship. By 1983 more than forty-five Churches and Synagogues had become
Sanctuaries and six hundred organizations had endorsed the group’s efforts (Smith 1996: 60-70).
Witness for Peace organized delegations of North Americans who visited Nicaragua to express
solidarity with the victims of Contra violence, hold prayer meetings and gather information about the
war in Nicaragua that they could publicize in the US (Smith 1996: 70-78). Pledge of Resistance began
by soliciting students and activists to commit to participating in demonstrations and other non-violent
acts of resistance in protest of US policy in Central America. It petitioned Congress, trained activists in
non-violent actions, organized marches and demonstrations, established an expansive communications
network and bought advertising in newspapers. Pledge was both the most daring and most popular of
these organizations. It interrupted congressional hearings, interrupted campaign appearance by procontra politicians and attempted to block shipments of weapons to the Contras. In 1984, it collected
over forty thousands signatures from people pledging to commit acts of civil disobedience if America
invaded Central America and, in April 1987, it organized one hundred thousands people to march in
Washington D.C. for peace in Central America (Smith 1996: 78-86).





The US Central American peace movement was a popular phenomenon that was given added
depth through its bases in religious institutions, the American left and university campuses. Many
participants put themselves at risk by traveling to war-torn countries, breaking US immigration law,
committing acts of civil disobedience. As during the Vietnam War, peace activists faced intimidation,
infiltration and repression from the US government (Gelbspan 1991). Despite its impressive capacity to
mobilize, the Central America peace movement did not achieve its overriding objective: pressing the
US government to end its support for the Contras and right wing forces in El Salvador and Guatemala.
The Reagan administration continued to support these parties in the face of public pressure and
the offers of Costa Rican president Oscar Arias to broker a peace process for the entire region. The
administration only supported peace negotiations once the leftwing rebels and the people of Central
America were so damaged by years of civil war and economic turmoil that they were willing to relent.
Nevertheless, the peace movement did make many important impacts on the procedure and outcome of
US foreign policy. By working with Congress it was able to defeat numerous bills licensing aid for
right wing paramilitaries and passed the Boland Amendment (1982), which temporarily prohibited US
intelligence agencies from providing aid to the Contras. Christian Smith argues that the movement
made Reagan’s objectives extremely difficult to implement by forcing hearings on human rights
violations.

Political Opportunities
Media coverage
During the 1980s, US proxy wars in Central America were a consistent feature of news coverage. The
Reagan administration deserves considerable credit for the high level of media coverage. By
advertising Central America as the site of the global Soviet-Cuban conspiracy and a prime threat to US
interests Regan intended to escalate media coverage and build support for his policies. The President
succeeded in getting the press to cover Central America, which became one of the most reported issues





of the 1980s. The New York Times ran an average of 3.4 articles or editorials a day on the subject
during the Reagan presidency (Smith 1996: 89-90) but this did not translate into popular support for the
administration’s policies. Between 1983 and 1985, public opinion polls consistently showed that
between fifty and sixty percent of American opposed sending aid to the Contras (Sobel 1989: 117). In
1986, US public opinion opposed sending aid to the Contras by a ratio of two to one despite the
administration’s efforts to raise support for its policies (Lafeber 1993: 333).
Although often deferential to the official portrayal of events (Fairness and Accuracy in
Reporting 1987), the mainstream press’ coverage of US involvement in Central America was a
fundamental resource for the mobilization of the solidarity movement. As early as 1982, three-fourths
of the American public were familiar with the conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador and half could
identify which parties the US supported. These statistics remained stable throughout the decade (Sobel
1989: 114-115). Mike Clark, an organizer for Witness for Peace explains,
The single most important factor was that the President made it impossible for people to
ignore Central America. If he would have made it possible for us to ignore it, I think we
would have. But it was his obsession for eight years. So we were helped enormously by the
fact that Regan focused on Central America as the most dangerous and sinister threat.”
(Smith 1996: 90-91)
Divided government and elites allies
The plan to invade Nicaragua with US forces provoked the initial wave of opposition to Central
America within the elite. From the start of the Reagan administration, the US Congress, the military as
well as the State Department and intelligence services manifested divisions over Central America
policy. From an activist perspective, the most directly important divisions existed within the Congress
where there existed was intense opposition to Reagan’s Central America policy agenda. Criticisms
from activists and legislators were reinforced in their criticisms by the dissidents within the military,
intelligence and diplomatic spheres, who challenged Reagan over the viability of his policies, the claim
that the region’s peasant insurgencies were the effect of a Soviet-Cuba conspiracy and the harm
inflicted on innocent civilians by aiding the Contras and the government’s of El Salvador, Honduras




and Guatemala. According to Smith, Congressional willingness to challenge Reagan over Central
America provided activists with “a partially effective institutional channel” to press their demands
(Smith 1996: 99).
By the end of its first term, the Reagan administration had become good at resolving the
divisions between its agenda and the Congress. From 1984 to 1988, opposition to Reagan’s objectives
in Central America evaporated to a considerable extent. According to Morris J. Blachman and Kenneth
E. Sharpe, the Reagan administration was successful in marketing its Central America policies in order
to attract support from liberal members of Congress by re-framing its agenda with “symbols of value to
moderates.” For example, it began to describe the El Salvadorian government as “reformist” and
claimed that both San Salvador and Washington supported “land reform, a negotiated settlement of the
war, democratization, and end to human rights abuses.” (1987: 1; 4) The administration went so far as
to help El Salvador organize what Edward S. Herman and Frank Broadhead refer to as a
“demonstration election” (1984) in which leftwing parties and candidates were systematically
intimidated from participating.
However, this public relations campaign helped convince the Congress to increase military and
non-military aid to the Duarte government in 1984. According to Sharpe and Blackman, “The
Deception was complete, evidenced by the fact that, in the end, the Democrats were priding themselves
for having forced the Reagan administration adopt their strategy.” (1987: 6)
Opposition
The Central America peace movement faced significant pushback from the Reagan administration. It
also had to contend with infiltration and harassment from the FBI and the proliferation of private
groups, such as Accuracy in Academia, that attempted to align the movement with the Sandinistas (a
claim which was true in some instances but also a gross over-simplification) and a vast international
Communist movement emanating from the Soviet Union (which was false). The solidarity movement
was also challenged directly by Reagan and Pat Buchanan for being a fifth-column (Smith 1996: 289



290). It is difficult to assess the overall impact of this counter-movement on the solidarity network.
However, the effects of government repression and private opposition groups are most likely
overshadowed by the Reagan administration ability to persuade Congress that it would be unwise to
continue to withdraw support for its vision in Central America.
International factors
The solidarity movement for Central America received very little support at the international level. The
decline of the USSR in international relations and relatively undiminished power of the US in world
affairs prevented the United Nations from challenging the US over its policies in the region.
Furthermore, the US was able to convince European countries to limit their aid to the Sandinista
government. This forced the Sandinistas to become more reliant on Cuba and the USSR which gave the
Reagan administration an additional justification for supporting the Contras. The ICJ ruling that the US
had illegally mined Nicaragua’s harbors provided Congressional opponents of Reagan with another
opportunity to challenge the administration. However, by refusing to challenge Nicaragua in court the
administration kept interest in the ruling to a minimum.

Discussion and comparison with Palestine
The above sections suggest that in the East Timorese and Central American contexts political
opportunities are a useful tool for explaining movement strategies and outcomes. It also illustrates
some of the difficulties involved in assessing the impact of social movements on US foreign policy.
The interplay of domestic and international forces is extremely complex. The analysis is further
complicated because media coverage, elite allies and the strength of opposition groups are all
opportunities for and effects of mobilization.
The two cases discussed herein suggest different routes to movement influence; but they also
illustrate some general themes in how political opportunity can facilitate or constrain movement
influence. Political environment filters mobilization through cultural and political coordinates and





determines its ability to activate the third-party support that is necessary for long-run achievement.
Ultimately the success of these groups is due to a combination of strong alliances, public support and
the disunity of opponents.
The East Timorese and Central American solidarity movements demonstrate the importance of
examining political opportunities in configurations, i.e. in the presence or absence of other measures of
political opportunity. For example, for decades the East Timorese solidarity movement languished in
obscurity primarily because Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor was barely covered by the US media.
Because the US-Indonesian relationship over East Timor was hardly discussed publicly, a lobby for
Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor never developed in the United States. When domestic and
international attention turned to East Timor in the early 1990s, the solidarity movement was the
principle force providing a cogent and convincing explanation of what was happening. The
movement’s narrative of a brutal Indonesian occupation became credible once frightening scenes of
Indonesian troops firing on non-violent demonstrators were widely seen. The fact that American
journalists were victims of this repression gave the movement an additional measure of credibility.
The Central America peace movement initially benefited from the enormous level of media
coverage and public opposition to the Reagan Administration’s regional policies. The influence of the
movement can be divided between Reagan’s two terms in office. In the beginning of Reagan’s first
term the joint action of social movement pressure, public opinion and media coverage was able to
prevent a US invasion of Central America and encourage Congressional legislation to set limits on
Washington’s ability to give its proxies military support. Ultimately, the peace movement lost a
framing contest with the Reagan administration. The administration exploited a key weakness in the
peace movement’s presentation: it could not get explicit elite support for the insurgencies it was trying
to defend from US imperialism. Legislators willing to oppose the Contras typically stopped short of
endorsing the Sandinistas and, according to Smith, were frequently more interested in using an
unpopular issue to “embarrass” the Reagan administration rather than taking a principled stand against




US imperialism (Smith 1996: 99). The administration exploited this situation by selectively
appropriating progressive causes. It convinced its allies in Guatemala and El Salvador to allow some
(mostly insignificant) land reforms and touted the (sham) elections that took place in El Salvador in
1984. Most importantly, it convinced Congress that its allies in the region were actually embattled
centrists trying to stop their countries from falling to extreme right-wing movements or Communists.
In the Palestinian case, the US solidarity movement exists in one of the most unfavorable
political environments imaginable. In each of the categories of political opportunity discussed in this
paper the movement faces severe obstacles.
Opposition
Unlike the East Timorese and Central American solidarity movements, the Palestinian solidarity
network is confronting a powerful counter-lobby, the influence of which is felt throughout America’s
political culture and connects many of the categories of the political opportunity discussed in this
section. Michael Massing writes that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) “is
widely regarded as the most powerful foreign-policy lobby in Washington” (2002) and its level of
influence has been compared that of the American Association for Retired People, the National Rifle
Association and the Tobacco lobby at the height of its influence.4 AIPAC’s leverage stems primarily
from its ability to guide money from wealthy pro-Israel individuals and Political Action Committees
(PACs) to political candidates who share its agenda and to punish those who do not by mobilizing
contributions to their opponents (Massing 2006). The Center for Responsive Politics reports that in the
run-up to the 2006 midterm elections pro-Israel PAC’s gave more than $3 million to candidates from
both parties (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007: 156). Either out of political calculation or genuine belief in

4
AIPAC is not the only significant pro-Israel lobby in US politics. However, it is widely regarded as
the most influential. Some other influential groups actively lobbying Congress include The Conference
of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the Zionist Organization of America,
Christians United for Israel and the American Jewish Committee. For the sake of brevity I have chosen
not to discuss the individual efforts of these groups. For a detailed discussion of these and other groups
consult Chapter 4 of John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt’s The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign
Policy (2007).




AIPAC’s agenda, the vast majority of Congress has granted the organization enormous influence over
how America’s relationship with Israel is discussed on Capitol Hill. Rather than deviating from the
AIPAC line, members of Congress regularly call on the group to conduct research, write legislation,
participate in hearings on the conflict and give them political advice (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007:
152-162). The force of AIPAC and other lobbying groups makes it almost impossible for solidarity
groups to make alliances in Congress. Few causes have the financial clout to challenge the pro-Israel
Lobby, and the Palestinian solidarity movement is no exception.
Divided government and elite allies
The result of the pro-Israel lobby’s efforts has been a uniquely high level of Congressional support for
Israel’s settlement of the West Bank, military strategy in the OPT and an aggressive and backing for its
positions in negotiations with the Palestinians. Because of the financial and organizational resources at
AIPAC’s disposal, members of Congress eagerly co-sponsor the legislation that it supports (and
sometimes helps to write) and few members of Congress are willing to oppose its agenda.
Media coverage
A running theme in this paper is that public discourse on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is grossly
unfriendly to Palestinians and deeply embedded in American political culture. The Israel lobby
deserves a considerable amount of credit for this fact. As Israel became an important ally of American
imperialism in the 1960s, public intellectuals, lobbyists and the Israeli state all worked to ensure that
Israel would be perceived as the “victim” of its conflict with its neighboring Arab states. This project
has been carried out along two major lines. After 1967, American elites aiming to solidify their
country’s new alliance with Israel in public opinion began to pay unprecedented attention to the Nazi
Holocaust. Finkelstein argues that the result of these efforts was an “ideology” of the Holocaust, which
“bears a connection, if tenuous, to reality” and serves to prop up the “significant political and class
interests” of the Israel Lobby and the American political establishment (2003: 3). This construction of
the Holocaust serves multiple closely related functions: It has largely supplanted Israel’s colonial



settler roots as the central historical lens of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this framework, the existence of
the state of Israel is understood primarily in relation to the suffering of European Jewry and its
colonial-settler reality is omitted (Massad 2006: 18-26). An extension of this frame is that criticism of
Israel is explicitly or implicitly considered anti-Semitic. Individuals who openly criticize Israel are
either often termed anti-Semitic either directly or by insinuation by influential organizations influential
journals or prominent public intellectuals.5
When Israel comes under heightened criticism for its conduct on the OPT the aforementioned
organizations, individuals and their allies can be counted on to proclaim that there exists a rising tide of
anti-Semitism or a “new anti-Semitism.” This claim purposefully confuses criticism of Israel with
bigotry towards Jews in order to assert the overall thesis that there is an aggregate increase in “antiSemitism.” Evidence of actual anti-Semitism in either Europe or America since the start of the second
intifada is minimal (Judt 2004). However, the Lobby is successful in using inflated arguments and
dramatic language to make a nearly identical set of arguments whenever Israel confronts a potential

For example, in 2002, after Norman G. Finkelstein spoke at an event sponsored by Georgetown
University student groups and the school’s Arab Studies Department, the ADL wrote a letter to the
school’s President accusing Norman G. Finkelstein of perpetuating “classic anti-Semitic stereotypes”
and of being a Holocaust denier (Friedman 2002). Similarly, The New Republic’s literary editor Leon
Wieselter (unsuccessfully) attempted to stop the publication of one of Finkelstein’s books by telling the
book’s publisher (Sara Bershtel of Metropolitan Books) that Finkelstein is, “poison, he’s a disgusting
self-hating Jew, he’s something you find under a rock.” Recently, Wieseltier has begun strongly
insinuating that conservative/libertarian writer Andrew Sullivan (a former editor at The New Republic)
is anti-Semetic. Wieseltier has accused Sullivan of seeing in American Jewry, a “clandestine and
cunningly organized power of a single and small ethnic group” and “dividing the American Jewish
community into good Jews and bad Jews” (Wieseltier 2010). John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s
writings on the Israel Lobby have come under particularly ubiquitous criticism. In The New Republic
Jeffrey Goldberg wrote that the two scholars were part of a long line of figures including Osama bin
Laden, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, David Duke, Louis Farrakhan and Father Coughlin who have
maliciously exaggerated the influence of Jews in the world. Mearsheimer and Walt, explained
Goldberg had made this mode of analysis their “special province” (Goldberg 2007). Eliot A. Cohen
responded to their writings under an editorial titled “Yes, It’s Anti-Semitic” and the ADL published an
analysis under the title “Mearsheimer and Walt’s anti-Jewish Screed: A Relentless Assault in Scholarly
Guise.” There is a significant literature on how the charge of anti-Semitism has been used increasingly
frequently since the beginning of the second intifada to invalidate criticisms of Israel and intimidate the
country’s critics. See, (Finkelstein 2005: Ch 1-3; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007: Ch 6; Roy 2004; Butler
2003; Klug 2004)
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public relations crisis. The charge that there is a “new anti-Semitism” was first unveiled by the ADL
after the October 1973 War when Israel was under intense pressure to reach a peace-accord with Egypt.
During the beginning of the second intifada when Israel once again came under pressure to reach a
peace agreement with the Palestinians and to restrain its counter-insurgency, the ADL once again
announced the existence of a “new anti-Semitism” (Finkelstein 2006: Ch 1). At the end of 2009, the
ADL released a report under the title, “Anti-Semitism has Moved from the Fringes to the Mainstream.”
Most of the evidence in the report was of marginal phenomena such as shooting at the Holocaust
museum in Washington D.C. by a neo-Nazi and Internet discussions blaming the financial collapse on
“greedy Jew thieves.” The one glaringly unambiguous piece of evidence of mainstream anti-Semitism
that the ADL provides is Richard Goldstone’s UN mandated investigation into Israeli and Palestinian
violations of the rules of international law.
The news media covers Palestine-Israel regularly. However, coverage is often structured around
the official Israeli claim that IDF violence is a response to Palestinian terrorism. This framework
ignores Israel’s own stated interests in controlling the OPT and denies that Israel’s treatment of the
Palestinians contributes to the conflict. Mainstream media rarely discuss the relevance of international
law in the conflict (Falk and Friel 2007). Finally, Palestinian deaths are under-reported relative to
Israeli ones. A Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting Press Release from August 2003 reports a pattern
of media outlets declaring the periods in which Palestinians but not Israelis were killed as “peaceful” or
“relatively peaceful” and declaring a “return to violence” only after Israeli deaths. The Press Release
reads,
The media's tendency to downplay-- or completely ignore-- Palestinian suffering and death is
nothing new. In late 2001 and the beginning of 2002, for example, a loose cease-fire declared
by Yasir Arafat led to a period of very few Israeli deaths, but sustained Palestinian deaths-- and
the American media repeatedly referred to it as a time of "relative calm." (Fairness and
Accuracy in Reporting 2003)
Additionally, in recent years, US media outlets have become increasingly reluctant to designate the
West Bank and Gaza Strip as Occupied Territories. According to research conducted by media analyst




Seth Ackerman, during the first eleven months of the year 2000 the phrase was used in less than one
percent of Associated Press articles on Palestine-Israel (2001: 62).
International factors
Many of the same international factors that are unfavorable to the Palestinian liberation movement also
hinder its allies abroad. Central to the persistence of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a highly evolved
system of control and repression that Israel has constructed within the OPT and Israel proper. This web
of military, juridical and discursive technologies of power has been largely successful in limiting and
controlling Palestinian resistance and producing consent for the Occupation amongst Israel's Jewish
citizens. As a result, Israel's reliability as an effective client has not come into doubt and the country
has not developed a substantial movement for Palestinian rights which could de-legitimize the
Occupation and Israel's relationship with the US.
So far this paper has touched on some of the repressive tactics that Israel has used to demobilize
protestors including the use of live ammunition, arrests, prohibiting activists from entering Israel and
the OPT and raiding the offices of transnational organizations. However, Israeli control in the
Territories is far deeper than these tactical responses to protests. John Collins describes the Israeli
policies in the West Bank and Gaza as “a model of perpetual counterinsurgency” in which “war is
waged directly on civilians and on the natural and built environment that ensures their survival” (2007:
12). Collins is referring to the dense network of settlements, Israeli-only roads, checkpoints, roadblocks
and walls that have segmented the OPT into individual islands with highly restricted access to one
another. There are over 500 checkpoints and roadblocks at any given time in the West Bank, which
divide the West Bank into six geographically distinct areas, each of which are even further, subdivided
by additional restrictions on movement. Jeff Halper refers to these restraints as a “matrix of
control…that allow Israel to control every aspect of Palestinian life” and which have “virtually
paralyzed the Palestinian population” (2006: 63) and limits communication and contact between
Palestinians. The extent of Israeli control in the OPT has helped to make a coordinated, widespread




protest of the type that took place during the first intifada nearly impossible. As a result regular protest
has been confined to specific townships such as Bil’in and Nil’in and spread relatively slowly to other
areas. The “matrix of control” has helped to thwart the type of Palestinian uprising that could makes
Israel’s occupation appear untenable and unappealing to its US sponsor.
In tandem with Israel’s creation of new forms of territorial and demographic control in the
OPT, the Israeli state has developed an effective system of legitimation that helps to preserve its
authority in the West Bank and Gaza. Whereas other colonial states, for example French Algeria, were
considered “permanent” parts of the mother country, Israel has explicitly and consistently stated that its
possession of the Palestinian territories is a temporary measure to limit Palestinian violence. Despite
forty years of military occupation and construction of a massive settler presence in the OPT
(numbering over 500,000 people on 40% of the West Bank) the claim of temporality is still used to
rationalize many of Israel’s violations of international law and human rights in the OPT.
The ability of the Israeli state to create domestic legitimacy for the Occupation is advancing
faster than the Palestinians and their allies can strategize against it. It is important to keep in mind that
a crisis in the legitimation of colonialism was a major reason why European states abandoned their
Asian and African possessions after World War Two (Judt 2006: Ch 9). A vivid example is the use of
torture as a counter-insurgency tactic in Algeria, which helped to scandalize colonialism in French
public life and internationally. Were Israel to face a similar legitimacy crisis it would be difficult for
US policy to continue to support the Occupation and the possibility of a genuine anti-Occupation
coalition of Israeli, Palestinian and international activists would be a possibility.
The Hague Regulations allow the occupying power the temporary right to confiscate
exclusively land for military needs. According to Neve Gordon, the official claims that Israel’s policies
in the OPT are temporary measures and responses to exceptional circumstances have been integral to of
Israel’s military-judicial control through most of history of the Occupation—and is a major way in
which the domestic legitimacy of the Occupation is preserved. However, Israel has frequently taken




Palestinian land while citing this provision only to transform it into the ground for settlements (2008:
122). Similar justifications have been used effectively to justify the use of torture against Palestinian
detainees. Although Israel claimed that torture was only used to stop “ticking time bombs,” its use has
been widespread and according to Gordon, “to silence and control the population rather than to extract
information” (Gordon 2008: 159). In fact, the Israeli High Court has licensed the use of torture by
Israeli security forces under the rationalization of exceptional circumstances (Finkelstein 2005: 165).
Although Israel has constructed a highly effective a system of control in the OPT, the
Palestinians and their allies do have some important resources at their disposal. For example, the
Palestinian right of self-determination is recognized amongst UNGA member states and a 2004
International Court of Justice advisory ruling declared Israel’s West Bank Wall a violation of
international legal principles. The OPT is one of the most highly researched areas in the world by
human rights organizations and international organizations—which produce a significant number of
detailed reports on Israel’s violations of international norms. Consequently, the transnational
movement for Palestine has made international law and the research of NGOs and international
organizations central elements of its information politics.
In the next section we will examine the capacity of the East Timorese and Central American
solidarity movements to affect their political environment. In both cases, movements were not the
passive recipients of circumstances but worked assiduously to create and expand political
opportunities. Although the situation facing the US Palestine solidarity movement is to a considerable
extent less favorable than the circumstances that either of these movements dealt with, their histories
do provide examples of the ways in which activists can prepare to take advantage of the rare moments
when they are presented with the opportunity to exert influence on policymakers. I argue that although
the solidarity movement for Palestine operates under uniquely difficult circumstances, the movements
for East Timor and Central America offer some valuable examples of tactics and strategy that proPalestinian activists can emulate.




Political environment and framing: how do movements navigate unfavorable
circumstances?
“No matter how momentous a change appears in retrospect,” write Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy
and Mayer N. Zald, “it only becomes an ‘opportunity’ when defined as such by a group of actors
sufficiently well organized to act on this shared definition of the situation” (1996: 8). Social
movements often exist in unfavorable political environments for long periods of time during which
they innovate, adapt and transform themselves. These periods offer a crucial opportunity for
movements to develop the resources that allow them to effectively mobilize once favorable political
opportunities arise. The cases of solidarity for East Timor and Central America provide important
lessons for how the solidarity movement for Palestine can develop the characteristics that will allow it
to mobilize effectively for political change if and when more favorable circumstances arise. Although
external factors determine to a considerable extent the outcomes of social movements, opportunities are
not immutable structures but are susceptible to the strategic choices and tactical innovations of
activists.
In some ways, the experience of American activists fighting against the Indonesian occupation
of East Timor parallels the problems facing the Pro-Palestinian movement in the US. For decades
supporters of East Timor found that it was all but impossible to bring public and elite attention to the
oppression of the East Timorese. During this period of obscurity activists worked to develop many of
the characteristics that made the movement influential later on. The strategy of developing alternative
media was extremely important to the movement during this period as the newsletters; articles and
books produced were a central method in connecting activists and building common reservoirs of
knowledge. Connections with the East Timorese Diaspora and East Timorese activists played an
important role. The transnational Timorese community provided testimonials of the horrors of
Indonesian occupation. The close connections between Freitlin’s leadership in exile and the solidarity
movement facilitated the construction of a consistent message that was delivered at the UN and to US




policy makers. As the occupation of East Timor became increasingly ethically and strategically
questionable for US policymakers, the decades old formation of the East Timorese solidarity
movement allowed them to emerge as a cogent, well-informed and persuasive source of information on
East Timor.
For the Palestinian solidarity movement, the history of solidarity with East Timor offers
positive examples of successful tactics. Both movements had to struggle and wait before their cause
became part of the political agenda. However, once the situation in East Timor became
widely known the solidarity movement emerged as a major source of information and analysis. The
lesson for the pro-Palestinian movements that a cause's intellectual resources and the alternative media
that it makes are important for both sustaining the group during quiet periods and influencing political
authorities once political agendas change for the better. Of course, the major differences between these
two cases is that there exists a significant intellectual infrastructure in the US that is reliably supportive
of the Israeli government and experienced in shaping public opinion. The major difference between
pro-Palestinian and pro-Israel propaganda is that Palestinian advocates have innumerable credible
resources in the reports produced by international human rights organizations, international
humanitarian organizations and international organizations which decry Israel's human rights record in
the OPT. The challenge facing the movement is to market this information in a way that allows it to
infiltrate discussions in both the media and Washington. This will most likely require condensing a
voluminous literature into a few major points and deploying it when significant events put the
Palestine-Israel conflict in the headlines.
A major reason for the successes of the US Central America peace movement was the
assistance it received from allied religious organizations. Churches in particular were integral to the
formation and political influence of the movement. Many important solidarity organizations such as
Sanctuary and Pledge of Resistance were born by Church activists. Throughout the 1980’s Churches
provided members, financial resources and communications networks that were essential to the




movement’s mobilization (Smith 1996: 109-117). The supportive role that religious groups played in
the Central America peace movement demonstrated to politicians that it could mobilize voters in
support of its preferred Central America policies.
The Palestine solidarity movement could potentially benefit by putting more resources into
forming alliances with progressive Churches. There is already considerable interest in the Palestinian
cause within certain corners of American Christian life. As we discussed in Chapter One, the
Presbyterian Church was an early riser on the divestment movement and has a sustained interest in
using its investment portfolio to bring an end to the conflict in Palestine-Israel. The Anglican Peace
and Justice Network, the World Council of Churches, the United Methodist Church, the Evangelical
and Lutheran Church have all passed resolutions in favor of divestment. These efforts have been
reinforced by the connections that many churches have to Palestinian Christians in the West Bank, and
particularly in the city of Bethlehem.
An important factor contributing to the influence of the Central America peace movement was
that the experience and memory of US aggression in Vietnam had badly damaged the credibility of US
foreign policy. This is true for it’s ideological legitimacy and efficacy and applies to non-elite and elite
circles. Walter Lafeber writes that the Administration ran into conflicts with “Top U.S. Army officers,
having suffered nightmares after Vietnam had turned the military into a public enemy…feared that the
Sandinistas were too well entrenched.” (1993: 280). The legacy of the Vietnam war left a substantial
portion of public opinion deeply averse to US interventionism as well as a large number of already
mobilized anti-war groups that joined the Central America peace movement (Smith 1996: 93-97).
It is plausible that the solidarity movement with the Palestinians could benefit from the Iraq war
in a way that mirrors the relationship between Vietnam and the Central America peace movement. A
pronounced drop in the popularity of the Iraq-war could benefit the Palestinian solidarity movement by
provoking a larger re-assessment of US foreign policy in the Middle East, and the influence of Israel in
the United States. The difficulties facing the US Iraq have already called into question the wisdom of




making military occupation a cornerstone of national security strategy. The influence that the Israel
lobby and the Israeli government exercised in the US decisions to go to war in Iraq has made public
intellectuals question the utility of the US-Israel special relationship and the strategic wisdom of the
Israeli government. The most significant evidence that this shift has begun is John Mearsheimer and
Stephen Walt’s book The Israel Lobby and the Making of US Foreign Policy. Mearsheimer and Walt’s
argument is made in “realist” terms and human rights and international law enter into their thinking
only to counter the common argument that the US’ support for Israel stems from a shared set of values.
The growth of “realist” critiques of the US-Israel relationship could be a parallel development that
reinforces the work of solidarity activists. Alternatively, it could the beginning of a unique coalition of
policy-minded mainstream scholars and activist/scholars united around a shared goal and common
enemy in the Israel lobby.6 Currently, anti-Iraq war and pro-Palestinian activists feel that they share a
common enemy in US imperialism and could potentially benefit politically by doing more to publicly
highlight the common sources of the two conflicts. One of the important lessons in the relationship
between Vietnam and Central America is that examples and analogies can have a significant effect on
the ability of a social movement to be persuasive.
To conclude, although solidarity movements historically have only rarely found truly favorable
political opportunities, the work that they do before these opportunities arise either in developing their
own organizational capacities or by re-shaping the ideological terrain on which discussions over US
foreign policy are waged, are of significant consequence. In the following two chapters we will
examine how the Palestinians and their allies are actively crafting a discursive framework for
understanding the conflict that uses human rights and international law as concepts to highlight
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injustices while searching for agency in places outside of Palestine such as schools, Churches,
international aid organizations and consumer markets where they believe they can win battles of public
discourse.





3: Transnational Activism and the Solidarity Movement for Palestine in
Historical and Theoretical Contexts
How does the political environment of international relations effect the direction of transnational social
movements? To answer that question I first explore how US power limits the opportunities for the
Palestinians at the international level. I argue that the transnational solidarity movement has
incorporated the laws, principles and norms of the international system into its framing processes while
facing strict limitations on its ability to rely upon the international organizations tasked with enforcing
these principles. With the constellation of BDS, rights discourse and the apartheid analogy in mind, I
reflect on how these frames function as both a strategic resource and crucial source of collective
identity that allows the movement to transcend national borders.

The solidarity movement in the context of international, regional and local Political
fields
Transnational movements do not just aim to build horizontal coalitions of activists but also strive to
make common cause with powerful international organizations such as the UNGA, the UNSC, the ICJ
and the ICC. In social movement theory when a local or national movement either receives recognition
or support from organizations such as these, it is said to have accomplished a “scale shift” (Tarrow and
McAdam 2005). Audie Klotz writes that, “relatively weak actors, such as movements that lack a formal
role in the inter-state political process, often use international organizations as avenues for leverage.”
(2002: 66) However, the ability of a movement to move up scales, as well as the way in which it moves
between scales often reflects the power hierarchies of the inter-state system. The civil society and
grassroots Palestinian organizations that are the backbone of the transnational solidarity movement are
in active conflict with Israel, and by extension they are also in conflict with the US, which restricts
their ability to use international organizations to their advantage. These movements are further
constrained by their conflict with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which is internationally





recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and holds observer status at
the UN. The PLO is hostile towards groups and movements that challenge its authority in intraPalestinian politics and uses its alliance with the US to suppress challengers. This political context has
limited the ability of the transnational movement for Palestine (and also the PLO) to use international
organizations to affect change. However, the UN and other international organizations contribute to the
information politics of the solidarity movement by conducting research on Israel’s policies in the OPT
and making Palestine a topic of discussion internationally.
In an article on the political and historical contexts facing the transnational anti-apartheid
movement Hakan Thorn writes that the “apartheid issue points to the Janus face of the UN as a political
community” (2006: 292) shaped in part by the balance of power amongst states and by its relationship
with global civil society and its own relatively independent and democratic institutions. This point also
applies to the Palestinian case. American veto power at the UNSC prevents the Palestinians and their
allies from using the institution to pressure or sanction Israel in order to get it to change its policies.
The International Criminal Court, which expressed interest in investigating claims that Israel
committed war crimes during its Winter 2008/2009 invasion in Gaza, would not be able to do so
without UNSC authorization.
However, in many of its other institutions the UN provides important resources for and a forum
to discuss the Palestinian cause. For example, Judge Richard Goldstone’s report on Israeli and
Palestinian violations of the laws of war during Israel’s Operation Cast Lead returned attention to
Israel’s extensive violations of international law a year after the fighting ended. The Goldstone
Report’s researchers and authors worked with human rights organizations operating in the OPT in
order to gather information of Operation Cast Lead. Once the report was released it received
widespread coverage on activist websites and was incorporated into the essays and speeches of
solidarity activists. The regular reports on Human Rights in the OPT commissioned by the UN’s
Human Rights Council add legitimacy to the concerns of the solidarity movement. John Dugard, the




Council’s special rapporteur for the OPT, has explained the similarities between Israel’s discriminatory
policies in the OPT and apartheid South Africa in his reports. The special rapparteur is arguably the
most prominent authority on the human rights situation in the OPT. The fact that his investigations give
credibility to Palestinian grievances infuriates both Israel and its advocates, who have tried to discredit
both Dugard and his successor Richard Falk.
The Palestinian solidarity movement has been able to make some moderate gains at the
European Union. However, although the movement has successfully pressured the EU to enforce some
of its trade policies with Israel it typically been ineffective in its attempts to get the organization to
sanction Israel for its violations of international legal norms. For example, in February 2010 the
European BDS movement won a campaign to persuade the EU High Court that the West Bank was not
part of Israel and that the EU could level import duties on products sold by Israeli companies doing
business in the OPT (Wielaard 2010). However, the BNC and the solidarity movement have not
succeeded in their attempts to persuade the EU to suspend the EU-Israel Association agreement on the
grounds that Israel has violated the agreement through an abysmal human rights record (Palestinian
Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National Committee 2009).
In 2002 and 2003, the EU Parliament passed resolutions calling for a EU trade boycott of Israel.
Virginia Tilley writes that the resolutions were no more than “rhetorical flourishes” that glossed over
the major national and business oppositions to the boycott as well as the fact that the EU “has every
reason to abjure a showdown with the United States over Israel” (Tilly 2005: 126). Even if activists
were able to exercise greater influence over EU policy, it would still have to confront the reality that a
core component of the US’ “special relationship” with Israel is that the US maintains a near-monopoly
over diplomacy in the Middle East. As a result, states and international organizations that could
potentially provide leverage for the Palestinians, such as the EU, are largely kept out of regional peaceprocesses (Tilley 2005: 91-106).
Inter-state hierarchies and conflicts have forced the transnational solidarity movement into




becoming an example of what is referred to as globalization from below. The limited relationship with
powerful state sponsors and international institutions has structured the movement into a loose, largely
non-hierarchical network of grassroots organizations. It has also made solidarity work a highly
localized affair in which activists typically appropriate the Palestinian cause into their own local
settings rather than bringing this issue to the attention of their states or to international organizations. In
this context, the most salient transnational aspect of the solidarity movement is the exchange of ideas
across national boundaries. The diffusion of the BDS frame in particular has created new opportunities
for local activists to join the struggle for Palestine by allowing them to tailor the cause to local
circumstances. It has also helped to from the structure of the movement of the by creating linkages
between Palestinian political organizations and a global civil society of activists.
Thus, a major challenge facing the solidarity movement is finding “hooks” between their local
circumstances and the Palestine-Israel conflict. This tactic includes publicizing and challenging
obvious examples of complicity in Israel’s war crimes such as college investment portfolios that own
stock in corporations that sell military equipment to the IDF. It also addresses much more subtle forms
of support, such as performing concerts or participating in film festivals in Israel. In the past two years
Bob Dylan, Leonard Cohen and Jean Luc-Godard have been accused by the BDS movement of
normalizing Israel’s crimes against the Palestinians by scheduling public appearances in the country.
The argument that cultural and academic relationships between Israeli institutions and famous nonIsraelis legitimize and reinforce Israel's Occupation of Palestine is often difficult to make resonate.
However, the logic of this claim is not lost on Israeli elites and public relations strategists. For
example, Judith Butler reports that after her visit to Tel Aviv University, the school’s rector declared:
"Look how lucky we are. Judith Butler has come to Tel Aviv University, a sign that she does not accept
the boycott." The conclusion Butler drew from this experience is instructive:
The fact is that there is no possibility of going to Israel without being used either as an
example of boycott or as an example of anti-boycott...I was instrumentalized against my will. I
realized I cannot function in that public space without already being defined in the boycott




debate. (Butler 2010).
Currently, both the solidarity movement and Israel are investing in the battle over Israel’s image. Since
its 2006 invasion of Lebanon, Israel has begun employing public relations firms to remake its image as
a site of recreation and popular culture.
Because activists are for the most part prohibited from jumping international scales local
political fields are often the site of the movement’s campaigns. These fields have a considerable impact
on of the outcomes of specific groups. Frances Hasso defines ‘Political field’ as the “legal-culturalhistorical-political environment within which a protest movement exists and to which it must respond”
(2005: xvii). Political fields filter movement issues through established cultural concepts of protest,
modes of organization and targets of political action.
The case of Hampshire College’s Students for Justice in Palestine provides an illustration of
how a field can allow for an issues effectiveness and explain a group’s strategy. Hampshire’s
institutional rules allowed H-SJP members to join decision-making institutions such as the Board of
Trustees, the Socially Responsible Investing Committee and Student Senate. The process of working
through campus institutions required activists to acquire a detailed understanding of the school’s
structure and of the complexities of its investment portfolio. This learning process shaped the group’s
strategy in two related ways: (1) The amount of learning involved required a near total commitment of
group resources into the divestment effort; and (2) because the group had promised the administration
that it would not publicly advertise any ‘divestment’ related to Israel’s human rights violations it had
difficulty conveying its message to and building bonds with the student body in the run up to the
decision to divest and in its aftermath (Stachiw 2009). In contrast, student groups without these
institutional avenues press their claims through petitions, protests and other noise-making practices that
raise the student body’s consciousness of the Palestinian question.
To conclude, the transnational movement for Palestine illustrates Thomas Olesen’s argument
that although social movements are “becoming increasingly transnational in both objectives and




activities, it does not also mean that they are becoming less local and national” (2005: 86, my
emphasis). The globalizing processes that facilitate the growth of new transnational movements do not
so much erode the distinct categories of local, national and international fields as they create
opportunities for activists to bridge them and redefine their meanings through political action.

Framing, diffusion and transnational movements
Della Porta and Tarrow define transnational protest as the “externalization of domestic contention and
the formation of durable transnational coalitions” (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005: 34). Transnational
framing processes and the diffusion of collective action repertoires are two of the main ways in which
causes travel across borders. Snow and Benford define frames as the ways in which activists are
“engaged in the production of and maintenance of meaning for constituents, bystanders or observers”
and “inspire and legitimate the campaigns of social movement organizations” (Snow and Benford
2000: 613; 614). Although modes of framing differ between groups, in general, social movements
organize their frames around two poles: one, the recognition and diagnosis of an injustice; and two, the
recommendation of collective actions which could be effective in ameliorating the injustice.
Transnational framing differs from other types of framing processes because it carries the added
burdens of connecting groups that are separated by geography and often also by ethnicity, citizenship
and culture. One of the principle ways in which activists overcome the obstacles of space and culture in
order to build coalitions across national borders is by re-writing their grievances in universal terms.
The Palestinian solidarity movement has organized its message around a constellation of international
legal principles and BDS tactics that comprise a transnational frame. The deployment and reception of
this frame is one of the main ways in which the solidarity movement for Palestine is transnationally
constructed. Palestinians and their allies have used political frames to link the Palestinian national
struggle to global politics, local issues and other social movements, facilitating the construction of a
collective identity and historical imaginary amongst activists.





In the Palestinian transnational movement injustice is typically constructed in terms of a
number of international discourses including human rights and international law. According to
Barghouti, the BDS movement “adopts a rights-based, not solutions-based, approach” in how it talks
about the conflict. Communications from the BNC, PACBI and the Stop The Wall Campaign all call
on Israel to comply with its obligations under international law and enunciate long lists of rights
including the Right of Return for Palestinian refugees, freedom of movement within the OPT and the
national rights of Palestinians within Israel.
For Barghouti the concept of rights function as an organizing concept that determines the
worthiness and viability of any proposed political solution. Like many other prominent figures in the
solidarity movement, Barghouti’s politics fuses post-national leanings with rights discourses and a
narrative of the dispossession and injustice suffered by Palestinians. For example, Barghouti explains
that he is “completely and categorically against binationalism because it assumes that there are two
nations with equal moral claims to the land and therefore, we have to accommodate both national
rights. I am completely opposed to that…” According to Barghouti, the state is not legitimized by
nation or indigenousness but by its fulfillment of rights. For this reason he argues that the only just and
viable solution to the Palestine-Israel conflict is a secular, democratic single state. A founding purpose
of this state is to address the historical rights of all segments of the Palestinians, those in the OPT, in
Israel and the Diaspora and to ensure that they have full civil, political and national rights and to return
to historic Palestine. It also offers protection for Jewish nationals in Palestine:
The only way that we can exercise our right to self-determination, without imposing
unnecessary injustice on our oppressors, is to have a secular, democratic state where nobody is
thrown into the sea, nobody is sent back to Poland, and nobody is left in refugee camps. We can
coexist ethically with our rights given back to us. (Barghouti 2009)
Other prominent figures in the solidarity movement have emphasized the utility of rights
discourse. Norman G. Finkelstein argues that activists should structure their arguments about the
Palestine-Israel conflict around human rights principles and away from potentially more divisive topics




and phrases such as “Zionism.” In his writings and lectures, Finkelstein relies almost exclusively on the
research of human rights organizations and international legal bodies. Typically, the objective of his
remarks is to show that a “consensus” exists amongst organizations, jurists, UNGA member states
and/or scholars that shows that Israel’s human rights record in the OPT is “abysmal” and proscribes an
end to Israel’s colonization of Palestine. Recently, Finkelstein has sharpened the argument for using
human rights discourses. He argues that there exists a “prior consensus” within American public
opinion in support of human rights that the role of the solidarity movement is to “energize.” Finkelstein
concludes a widely circulated lecture on political strategy by asking,
Shouldn’t we use a vocabulary that registers and resonates with the public conscience and the
Jewish conscience, winning over the decent many while isolating the diehard few? Shouldn’t
we instead be asking, Are you for or against ethnic cleansing, for or against torture, for or
against house demolitions, for or against Jews-only roads and Jews-only settlements, for or
against discriminatory laws? (Finkelstein 2008)

The mode of grievance framing exemplified by Barghouti and Finkelstein resembles many of the
Zapatista’s frames that scholars credit for their international popularity. Clifford Bob argues that the
immense international appeal of the Zapatista uprising was an effect of the conscious efforts by the
leadership of the uprising to portray themselves as emerging from “civil society” rather than
“conventional political and economic institutions” (2001: 325) such as the state, political parties and
social classes. The Palestinian BDS and anti-Wall leadership also emphasize that they represent a
substantial swath of Palestine’s civil society and NGO community and are largely independent from
Fateh and Hamas. Both insurgencies also frame themselves as non-violent challengers to militarized
states. After putting down their weapons only days after launching an armed rebellion the Zapatistas
“quickly came to appear less violent than the Mexican government” and its “heavy-handed
counterattacks” (Bob 2001: 326). Palestinians broadcast a parallel message of weakness through the
videos of their anti-Wall protests that they circulate on the Internet and in international lectures. BDS
activist Ali Abunimah argues that the non-violent character of the BDS campaign is one of the reasons




it deserves widespread support (Abunimah 2009). Finally, both movements are purposefully
ambiguous about the ultimate form of political solution they are fighting for. The Zapatistas’ action
frames emphasized the worldwide injustices of neoliberal economic policies and the ability of a global
and diverse civil society while being unclear about the type of post-neoliberal states that they were
fighting for. Although members the Palestinian transnational movement, and especially solidarity
activists in the US and Europe, have invested a considerable amount of time and effort into debates of
the relative merits of the one and two-state solutions, as Barghouti’s comments indicate activists prefer
to emphasize grievances, agency and rights discourse over the complexities of state-building.
The solidarity movement’s framing repertoire finds agency to redress these injustices through
BDS. The campaigns for boycott, divestment and sanctions are not just a tactic but also a crucial way
in which activists create transnational linkages and conceptualize their own ability to challenge Israeli
policy. Activists argue for the viability of BDS in ending the Occupation of Palestine by citing it as a
central tactic of the transnational anti-apartheid movement, which is credited for being an indispensible
element in South Africa’s democratic transition. Palestinian BDS leaders as well non-Palestinian
activists regularly liken their cause and strategy to the South African example. The 2004 PACBI
statement reads:
In view of the fact that people of conscience in the international community of scholars and
intellectuals have historically shouldered the moral responsibility to fight injustice, as
exemplified in their struggle to abolish apartheid in South Africa through diverse forms of
boycott,
A popular and widely circulated article by activist Will Youmans titled, “The New Anti-Apartheid
Movement: The Campaign to Divest From Israel” writes,
Divestment's underlying logic is compelling as it is simple. South Africa's
Apartheid government operated a partite system of administration: one
component of the government privileged whites exclusively and fundamentally
because they were white, while the other subordinated blacks. This was on the
basis of race. In the same way, Israel clearly privileges humans of Jewish ancestry
over those of Palestinian descent. The movement's logic is bolstered by the
historical and experiential proximity between the black South Africans and the
Palestinians. In 1999, CNN reported that Nelson Mandela told the Palestinian
assembly, "the histories of our two peoples correspond in such painful and
poignant ways that I intensely feel myself at home amongst my compatriots.”




(Youmans 2002)
The apartheid analogy has become an especially prominent tactic in the movement’s framing strategy.
In 2009 activists in over 40 cities hosted events, as part of “Israeli Apartheid Week” a global event
comprised of local teach-ins, lectures, film screenings and training sessions. The idea of organizing an
“Israeli Apartheid Week” originated in at the University of Toronto in 2005 and was recently endorsed
by PACBI.
The solidarity movement has coalesced to a considerable extent around the accuracy and utility
of the apartheid analogy, but in mainstream and elite circles the analogy remains highly controversial.
Although a growing number of respectable figures (Jimmy Carter, Ehud Barak, John Dugard, Desmond
Tutu) and organizations (B’tselem, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel) have acknowledged the
resemblance of the two situations, it is impossible to enter the claim into mainstream conversation
without being furiously denounced. It is difficult to assess the resonance of the apartheid analogy with
the greater public. However, there are reasons to believe that there is a considerable growth in the
number of people who find it plausible. For example, Jimmy Carter’s Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid
reached number 1 on the New York Times best sellers list. Furthermore, a number of prominent
American social scientists including John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt and Tony Judt have used the
analogy in their books and commentaries.
BDS has also provided an answer to one of the foremost problems facing an emergent
transnational movement: how to find targets for collective action across borders. Executing a BDS
campaign consists of finding connections between the situation in the OPT and the broader world. For
example, the various campaigns for an academic and cultural boycott of Israel emphasize that
collaborative projects between Israeli and non-Israeli institutions normalize the occupation and
dispossession of the Palestinians by muting protests against Israel’s rogue status. Proponents of the




academic campaign argue that not only are Israeli schools and academics complicit in the Occupation
of Palestine, but so are non-Israelis who in collaborating with them overlook the ways in which
seemingly a-political academic work negates the impact of Israel's arbitrary state violence. Judith
Butler notes that a significant innovation of Omar Barghouti and PACBI has been to “revise and
expand our operative notions of academic freedom” by implicitly suggesting that “academic freedom
only gains its meaning within a broader conception of freedom on the condition that other basic
political entitlements are first secured.” In the OPT, where the IDF regularly restricts the access of
students and professors to their local universities and prohibits them from returning home after
studying abroad, the ‘academic freedom' of Palestinians is not suspended, but the basic conditions
necessary to exercise free inquiry are absent. Barghouti’s argument, and Butler’s reading of it,
problematize contemporary doctrines of academic freedom that are unable to “rise to the occasion and
condemn the widespread abrogation of rights” (2006: 9; 10; 11) and urges academics to consider the
ways in which these doctrines deflect attention from large-scale violations of human rights.
Barghouti and Butler both make compelling arguments for the academic boycott of Israel.
However, with the exception of the UK’s University Teachers and the University College Unions’
decision to endorse an academic boycott of Israel, the campaign for academic boycott has not gained
the same traction as consumer boycotts and divestment campaigns. The “framing” of academic boycott
follows the same logic as these other measures; both identify a link between a local or national
institution and the oppression of the Palestinian and ask involved parties to sever this connection out of
moral, legal or professional obligation. Why then has the academic boycott campaign been relatively
unsuccessful in gaining institutional supporters? Part of the reason is that the arguments put forward for
the academic boycott rely on interpretations of the principle of academic freedom-a principle which is




still unsettled. Unlike activists working on consumer or financial BDS campaigns, advocates of the
academic boycott are attempting to use the Palestinian cause to re-shape the norms of their targets.

Example and emulation
The Palestinian solidarity movement consciously emulates the examples of other social movements.
The transnational anti-apartheid movement is a favorite exemplar for Pro-Palestinian activists because
of the similarities between the apartheid regime and Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians and because
the strategy of boycott, divestment and sanctions appears adaptable to the Palestinian cause.
Movements relate to past examples in complex and multiple ways. Scholarship on emulation usually
focuses on the ways in which successful examples of collective action help current movements choose
tactics and transcend objective barriers to mobilization. Movements also negotiate these examples in
complex and dynamic ways. In the pro-Palestinian context, the successful example of the anti-apartheid
movement is an encouraging instance of transnational agency but it always carries with it potential
pitfalls.
Sean Chabot and Jan Willem Duyvendak argue that research on the diffusion of collective
action tactics gives an image of diffusion as a simple transfer of repertoires while neglecting the reality
that the diffusion is “dynamic, ambiguous and malleable”; the application of a repertoire results in
“adaptation and reinvention” (2002: 706; 711). Although the solidarity movement often references its
debt to anti-apartheid activism the actual implementation of the tactics of the anti-apartheid movement
support Chabot and Duyvendak’s hypothesis. Because Israelis are largely not viewed as colonial
settlers or racists, as white South Africans were, constructing protest frames and actions is considerably
more difficult. As described in Chapter One, activists in New York City found that their protests
against Israeli chain stores did not resonate with a mass audience and thus had to seek out new targets




such as the Africa-Israel company in order to make their case. Attempts to replicate key elements of the
boycott against South Africa such as the academic boycott have been largely unsuccessful and
Hampshire's successful divestment campaign being a lone success.
The distinguishing feature of solidarity with Palestine in comparison to anti-apartheid activism
is that its targets are more obscure. A short list of institutions that the anti-apartheid movement helped
convince to sanction South Africa includes the International Table Tennis Association which in 1956
expelled the South African team from its competitions, the UNGA which in 1977 passed a resolution
calling for an arms embargo and Chase Manhattan Bank which in 1986 refused to roll over the
country’s debt (Schwartzman 2001: 117). A major reason for this divergence is that while South
Africa, especially after the Soweto uprising (1977), was widely seen as a racist effect of European
imperialism, Israel is often discursively constructed (in the US at least) as a sympathetic victim of
European anti-Semitism and Arab-Muslim aggression (Massad 1993). Anti-apartheid activists
challenged the indifference of the public to South Africa’s political system. By contrast Palestine
solidarity activists often have to accomplish the much more difficult task of re-structuring historical
consciousness of the Palestinian-Israeli contrast. Not surprisingly, some of the BDS movement’s most
significant successes have come through working with institutions that were already aware of and
sympathetic to Palestinian grievances. UNICEF and OXFAM, for example, provide material relief to
Palestinians in the OPT and actively work to raise awareness of the deleterious effects of the
Occupation on health and human security in the territories.7
The example of the transnational anti-apartheid movement looms large in the consciousness of
the BDS movement not only as a replicable model of successful collective action but also as a source

    




 

   

 


of identity and a mobilizing narrative. During the anti-apartheid movement “solidarity” with Black
South Africans “was constructed as a fundamental value that defined the collective identity” of the
movement (Thorn 2006: 295). By contrast, in the transnational movement for Palestine a belief in the
efficacy and justness of the BDS repertoire, based on its power in the Apartheid context, serves a
parallel function. Francesca Polletta argues “some stories are more effective than others not because of
the content or skill with which they are told but because of assumptions made about their tellers.”
(2006: xi-xii) BDS activists have recognized the importance of attracting prominent members of the
South African anti-apartheid movement to affirm the similarity between the two causes. In this regard,
no one is more prominent than Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who was solicited by H-SJP to endorse
their divestment campaign and wrote: “see what these students have accomplished as a replica of the
support of their College of our struggle against apartheid in South Africa. Hampshire College's
decision to divest should be a guiding example to all institutions of higher learning” (Tutu 2009). The
endorsement helps to bring respectability to a controversial issue but it also solidifies a shared sense of
promise and community.
So far, the apartheid analogy had helped solidarity activists construct a collective identity and
map some elements of their strategy. However, identification with an analogy, narrative or identity can
also foreclose potentially productive interpretations and deny activists the opportunity to recognize the
complexity of their own situation. The late Edward Said exhorted the Palestinians and their allies to
recognize and act upon the differences between Palestine-Israel and the twentieth century’s other anticolonial movements. He emphasized that because of Europe’s history of anti-Semitism there existed a
far more widespread and durable sympathy in Europe and the United States for Israel than for other
nations with a colonial-settler history. A major difficulty in marketing the apartheid analogy is the




hesitancy of the general population to see Israelis as perpetrators rather than victims of violence. It is
plausible that as a result activists will shift the discursive terrain more towards concepts and frames,
such as international law, that offer a neutral baseline for judging the legitimacy of Israel’s actions in
the Occupied Territories. To a certain extent this shift may already be taking place. For example, at the
beginning of the second intifada there was significant enthusiasm for proliferating and defending the
slogan “Zionism is racism.” Similar to the apartheid analogy, this equation became a flashpoint of
discussions of Palestine-Israel, provoked fierce denunciations from Zionist activists and confused many
of the people it addressed. Currently, although there is widespread recognition of the racist
characteristics of the Israeli state within the pro-Palestinian movement, “Zionism is racism” has largely
fallen out of favor as a shorthand explanation for the oppression of the Palestinians and has been
replaced with a more complex repertoire of arguments and comparisons.

Framing and state-centered social movement processes
The principle framework of social movement theory posits a “state-centered” process of political action
in which the state functions as the principle site of historical change by creating the context for
collective action and determining the limits to which changes can be made. In this section I argue that a
state-centered perspective remains a useful tool for explaining the development and limitations of
political framing related subjective elements of protest by engaging with a recent article by Polly
Pallister-Wilkins which argues that the anti-Wall protests in Bil’in and other West Bank towns are not
accounted for by state-centered paradigms.
Pallister-Wilkins’ article, “Radical Ground: Israeli and Palestinian Activists and Joint Protest
Against the Wall” (2009) argues that the Palestinian-Israeli anti-Wall protests in Bil’in and other West
Bank villages “challenge many of the logics of state-based social change encompassed in much of
social movement theory.” They do this by, “eschewing the ‘politics of demand” and choosing not to
make “appeals to the State of Israel as they believe they would not be listened to.”(Pallister-Wilkiins:




398) Pallister-Wilkins writes that these protests manifest a “convergence of protest-anarchism with
more traditional anti-occupation activism.” (Pallister-Wilkiins: 396) These protests and are the most
recent symptom of a larger resurgence in anarchist-protest traditions that are evidenced in the Zapatista
rebellion and the seizure of abandoned factories by workers in Argentina and India (Pallister-Wilkiins:
395).
Thus, Pallister-Wilkins’ argument is a bi-level one. She claims that the subjective dimension of
the anti-Wall protests has a heavy anarchist element that does not mesh with social movement theory’s
stereotype of a movement that makes claims upon the state. There is also an added level to PallisterWilkins’ argument; she implies that because Palestinian and Israeli protestors have chosen to
emphasize certain themes they have begun to change the objective dynamics of their struggle in ways
that traditional social movement theory cannot comprehend.
The first claim accurately represents some of the subjective elements of the anti-Wall protests,
although Pallister-Wilkins is unable to harmonize important examples of “claim making” against the
Israeli state with her thesis that the central gesture of the anti-Wall protests is anarchist. The residents
of Bil’in in particular have made serious efforts to use the Israeli courts to alter the path of the wall and
to gain reparations. Refusing to come to grips with this plank in the anti-Wall struggle means that
Pallister-Wilkins severely circumscribes the framing tactics of the residents of Bil’in and their allies.
The Israeli High Court’s ruling contains substantial contradictions, is largely sympathetic to the IDF’s
position and legitimizes the colonization of Palestine. However, Palestinians have incorporated its
selective recognition of Palestinian grievances and gestures towards legal redress into their rhetoric.
This suggests that the subjective perspectives of the movement are not as anarchist as Pallister-Wilkins
suggests. Activists believe that they can use the state to legitimize their claims in certain cases and
press the de-legitimation of Israeli colonialism through the institutions of the Israeli state.
Even if the claims of the anti-Wall movement were not directed at the Israeli state, as PallisterWilkins argues, this would not clarify the relationship between the state and its challengers. State



centered social movement theory posits that states shape collective action in three main ways: by
licensing certain avenues of political activism and prohibiting others, repressing challengers and
socially constructing discourses of legitimate and illegitimate protest. This section is primarily
concerned with the third relationship, i.e. the connection between states and the framing strategies of
activists.
To understand this relationship, we must broaden the scope of our inquiry to beyond PalestineIsrael and look at the broader context under which the discourses of the joint anti-Wall demonstrators
have acquired their legitimacy. The importance of human rights and other rights discourses in
international relations is traceable to a considerable extent to the efforts of NGOs and activists to
circulate these ideas; however, states, originally the targets of rights discourse, have played a crucial
role in legitimizing these discourses by writing them into international institutions and treaties. The aim
of the protestors is to appeal to foreign publics who have been educated in rights discourses through the
domestic legislation and official language of states and to get states to apply their own normative or
legal values on human rights to Israel. The European Union’s focus on human rights and its extensive
trade relationship with Israel make it a target for activists. Activists have courted prominent EU
officials and delegations to the West Bank. In 2008 Louis Morgantini the Vice President of the
European Parliament spoke at the third annual Bil’in International Conference on popular resistance
and participated in a demonstration against the Wall. Lawmakers from European states and the EU
regularly visit Bil’in and other Palestinian villages protesting against the Wall at the invitation of
Palestinian activists in order to assess the Wall’s impact and Israel’s counter-demonstration tactics.
Since the writing of Pallister-Wilkins’ article, communication with EU officials has become an
increasingly prominent part of the anti-Wall movement. In January 2010, and 11 member EU
delegation visited Nil’in during a wave of arrests of anti-Wall leaders and their relatives. Omar
Barghouti responded by announcing that “We will tell them: the EU cannot continue to be impartial.
The EU has great leverage over Israel, if they want to use it. The least they can do is stop military




cooperation." Khalida Jarrah of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and a member of the
Palestinian Parliament also spoke of great communication with the EU and told the delegation “this
message must reach the international community. We haven't seen a strong reaction from the
international community. The popular resistance movement is a political movement, which requires a
political solution, and political support" (Ma’an News Agency 2010).
In sum, a state-centered focus provides an effective lens to examine the joint Palestinian-Israeli
protests in Bil’in. The Israeli state shapes the context in which protest takes places and protest
strategies in the main address Israel and other states to change the route of the wall. At the inter-state
level, the ascendancy of human rights discourses and international law has shaped the discourse of the
protesters. These protests are one link in a much larger chain of transnational activism; but their
reverberations are widely felt throughout the solidarity movement.





4: Strategies of representation, reflexive practices and the social
construction of protest: Palestinian videos and the politics of solidarity
A group of blue bodies with blue faces, pointy ears, stringy brunette hair, kaffiyehs around their waists
and flags in their hands march through paved hills towards a metal fence and a group of soldiers.
Seconds later, smoke bombs and tear gas canisters explode in the vicinity and the blue bodies retreat
out of the frame, only to return seconds later and throw the unexploded ordinances back towards the
soldiers. This is a scene from the Palestinian town of Bil’in, where every week for the past five years
Palestinians, Israelis and internationals have attempted to march on the Israeli Wall that bisects the
town and allocates some of its most viable agricultural lands to an Israeli settlement. But now there is a
new change in tactics. The blue bodies are Palestinians costumed as the “Na’vi’”, an indigenous
community threatened by imperialism in the American science fiction film Avatar. The protestors are
outnumbered by photographers and filmmakers wearing gas masks so that they can continue to
document the confrontation amidst Israel’s heavy-handed counter-protest.
Although the march ends with the protestors dispersed and assaulted, the action is a success. A
week and half later, a video of the protest has been widely circulated on the Internet. For years,
Palestinians in Bil’in and their allies have circulated videos of their weekly anti-Wall demonstrations,
but the footage of the “Avatar” video is of a higher quality than the other videos. The relatively clean
editing of the film’s three minutes and the large presence of documentary filmmakers reflects a
conscious attempt to exploit the Internet’s unprecedented ability to circulate moving images. As a
communicative strategy, the “Avatar” protest has succeeded in its major objectives: obtaining
international attention and temporarily re-framing the conflict in terms of colonialism and indigenous
rights.
In the past few years, video making has been an increasingly visible tactic in the Palestinian
national struggle. Palestinians, human rights groups, documentary filmmakers and solidarity activists
have contributed to a growing canon of protest videos on the Palestine-Israel conflict. These videos,




which range from amateur footage of life under occupation to documentaries which are screened at
international film festivals, are not only strategic deployments against the dominant Israeli narrative of
the conflict; they are also discursively “reflexive practices” that convey assumptions about how
Palestinians, human rights organizations and solidarity activists “position themselves as contributing to
social and cultural change” (Littler 2005: 229). This section looks at two related examples of video
activism: videos of West Bank Palestinians and internationals demonstrating against the Wall (which
includes the above mentioned “Avatar” protest), and the videos produced as part of the Israeli human
rights organization B’tselem’s “Shooting Back” project. For each example, this section attempts to
identify the strategic aims behind it, its understandings of activism and agency or its “reflexive
character”, and its contribution to the social construction of activist networks. In a final section, I argue
that an information politics rooted in these new media has the potential to create new political
opportunities for the transnational solidarity movement for Palestine by changing public perceptions of
the Palestine-Israel conflict and creating new contexts in which the movement can expand its
membership and express its collective identity through political action.

Bil’in: towards a documentary of intifada in a Palestinian village
Videos of protests in towns such as Bil’in and Nil’in that are immediately leaked onto the Internet and
sent to the news media and are planned to act as a counterweight to the Israeli government’s
monopolization of the conflict’s narrative and claims to accurate information. The overarching purpose
of these protests and the videos made about them is to destabilize the discursive arrangement, social
realities and racial encoding of Palestinians and Israelis. In other words, they seek to cause viewers to
question their pre-conceived notions of the conflict - notions that may have been influenced or even
completely formed by the mainstream media's narrative, which in turn is infused with its own
conscious or unconscious bias. A common target of protest videos is the popular narrative that
Palestinians commit acts of “terrorism” while Israeli violence is merely responsive to and contingent





on these Palestinian acts of terrorism (Chomsky 2001). Videos of the protests in Bil’in emphasize the
non-violent elements of Palestinian protest. The documentary film Bil’in Habibti (Bil’in My Love)
(Carmeli-Pollak: 2006) devotes significant attention to a wheelchair-bound activist’s attempt to
organize a march of the handicapped against the Wall. This protest was specifically conceived of as a
retaliation against the IDF for using counter-demonstration tactics that put the disabled at risk, an
inversion of the conventional narrative of Palestinian violence and Israeli response.
Protest footage also challenges the binary interpretation of the conflict as a struggle between a
“Western” Israel and a “Non-Western” Palestine. In addition to challenging the claim that Palestinians
do not or cannot act non-violently in support of their national goals, protest videos unsettle the
conflict’s identity binary by including “Western” people from Israel, the US and Europe in the antiWall protests. This is especially true for the rough footage shown by AATW on the group’s 2009 North
American fundraising tour that shows Israeli youth with “white” physical characteristics working
alongside Palestinians to protest the destruction of Palestinian-owned farmland underneath the Wall’s
route. AATW presenters explain why in many videos they are shown undertaking actions such as
cutting through parts of the Wall without the participation of Palestinians. These actions are undertaken
with the support of Palestinians, but Palestinians themselves are prevented from participating in them
because the penalties for such actions, such as long jail sentences, are too severe. Also, Israeli
solidarity activists have the ability to move through the West Bank with a freedom that Palestinians do
not have. Hasso describes the West Bank as, “racial-spatial subordination [which] expresses itself
through a variety of mechanisms: Israeli checkpoints, special roads for Jews that avoid Palestinian
villages and towns, segregated marketplaces and restaurants, Jewish settlements…” (2005: 25). The
relative freedom of Israelis to navigate these spaces and physically challenge their racial biases reframes the conflict along the lines of an anti-racist, anti-colonial struggle, rather than merely a struggle
between two antagonist ethnic groups.





The framing of the conflict in these videos produces new social realities and discourses. Israelis
do not appear as the civilian “white” victims of Palestinian violence but almost exclusively as soldiers
tasked with enforcing a regime of “racial-spatial subordination.” The AATW footage captures soldiers
in the midst of destroying Palestinian farmland, arresting protestors and shooting at demonstrators. It
also documents the injuries suffered by Israelis and Palestinians alike from Israel’s counterdemonstration tactics. Bil’in Habibti takes a different approach. The filmmaker interviews an IDF
general that confronts Bil’in’s protests every Friday. The General talks about how he works hard to
minimize the suffering of the protestors but that the Palestinians invite their own punishment by
resorting to stone throwing. In a revealing sequence, the General orders his soldiers to disperse the
“march of the disabled” with tear gas. He claims that he did not know that the protestors were
handicapped, which is plausible, and chastises the Palestinians for attempting to exploit their suffering.
The end result of this sequence is not to dehumanize the General, who comes across as sincere
throughout the film. Bil’in Habibti is an interesting twist to the Israeli device of the “good soldier” who
balances his official duties with a selective sympathy towards the Palestinians. Unlike Israeli
documentary narratives, in which the “good soldier” is usually the end of the argument about the
morality of the Israeli state and society, Bil’in Habibti recognizes the ambiguity that inheres in a
soldier’s consciousness but does not allow it to obscure or negate the violent impact of the occupation.

Shooting and racializing: the politics of “Shooting Back”
The footage of IDF soldiers and Israeli colonists harming Palestinians that B’tselem has cultivated
through its “Shooting Back” project functions in an analogous way, albeit without the same type of
preparation. “Shooting Back” provides Palestinian civilians with hand held video recorders and basic
video training. B’tselem has handed out roughly 100 cameras to Palestinians and the project has
produced graphic images of masked Jewish settlers assaulting unarmed Palestinian farmers and a short





video of an IDF soldier shooting a bound Palestinian in the foot.8 These episodes are representative of a
widespread pattern of abuse and harassment of Palestinians in the OPT at the hands of soldiers and
settlers alike that has been described in detail by Palestinians in human rights reports, but has not
reached the broader public and were often dismissed as fabrication. Oren Yakobovich, who runs the
program for B’tselem, explains that the project was launched in part because "from our past
experience, in many cases a Palestinian's word is given less weight than that of a soldier, a policeman
or a settler" (Azoulay 2008).
This approach can be contrasted with the way in which the Hezbollah have utilized self-made
videos in Lebanon. In an essay on the Lebanese Hezbollah’s self-made videos of militants attacking
IDF forces, Walid el Houri and Dima Saber write that these videos act as a “metaphor of
empowerment” (2010: 71) for the occupied Lebanese viewers who are accustomed to encounter the
IDF from the narrow perspective of victimhood. For the Palestinians, “Shooting Back” is also a
“metaphor of empowerment”, albeit in ways that differ from el Houri and Saber’s framework. Both
sets of videos attempt to empower resistance to Israeli military policies by representing another side of
the conflict. However, in the “Shooting Back” project, agency comes from the power to represent and
deploy a discrete message to a sympathetic foreign audience. Unlike the Hezbollah’s videos, which aim
to intimidate Israelis by demonstrating resistance, “Shooting Back” courts Israelis and other potentially
sympathetic non-Palestinians by portraying (and therefore perhaps defining) the Palestinians as victims
of Israeli violence.
The “Shooting Back” project makes a number of assumptions about Palestinian agency. The
first is that Palestinian narration is either absent from or suspicious to hegemonic narrative practices.
Based on the mainstream media’s record of covering the Palestine-Israel conflict, and the broader
discourse of untrustworthiness surrounding Arab peoples, this position is inarguable. Therefore,
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Palestinians need to use inarguable representation, such as video cameras, in order to make their claims
legible. This reading of the political situation, and Palestinian positions within it, leads to a very limited
sense of Palestinian agency that is actual compatible with mainstream views. For example, Massad
argues, that the presentation of Palestinians as victims of unfortunate and non-contextualized violence
has an enduring place in US media commentary on the Palestine-Israel conflict, a framework he calls
the “Limits of Racialized Discourse.” In this framework, once Palestinian suffering becomes
“unavoidable” (for example after the Sabra and Shatilla massacres) Palestinians become supportable
“insofar” (and only in so far) as they “are physical victims, that is objects of Israeli violence” but when
Palestinians actively resist Israeli domination, or refuse to accept US/Israeli political conditions,
“condemnation ensues, as if in outrage that objects have presumptuously assumed the role of subjects”
(1993: 97).
Unlike the Hezbollah’s approach, which attempts to shift the balance of power by presenting
Lebanese as militarized subjects, “Shooting Back” tends to portray the Palestinians as de-politicized
and victimized subjects. What the viewers of “Shooting Back” are meant to identify with is the need to
protect the bare life of the Palestinians. But the project stops short of advocating the political program
of the Palestinians or decrying the ethno-nationalist ethos of the Israeli state. “Shooting Back” is an
interesting title/metaphor for B’tselem’s project. B’tselem is a relatively conservative human rights
group, which rarely includes Palestinian political agency as one of the rights it is protecting.9 By
contrast, Palestinian human rights groups Al Haq and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR)
assert that under international law the Palestinian people, and all people, have a “right to resist”
military occupation and colonialism. These groups distinguish between legal and non-legal modes of

9
For example, there is a link on its website titled “Palestinian Violence” which links to a page titled
“Attacks on Israeli Civilians by Palestinians.” The equation of Palestinian violence with anti-civilian
attacks is incomplete and therefore arguably misleading as Palestinian violence also frequently targets
Israeli soldiers and military infrastructure (for example the West Bank Wall). Furthermore, many
Palestinian protest tactics, such as stone throwing and the use of slingshots against the IDF, are more
symbolic than realistically threatening. Nonetheless, Israel imposes heavy prison sentences for stone
throwing and often responds to it with lethal force.




resistance but see Palestinian political action and not just Palestinian life as a cause that they have a
duty to defend.
The other set of assumptions made by “Shooting Back” that I would like to question concerns
the position and role of the project’s audience and their capacity to engage in a transformative politics.
Much like the AATW video presentation and Bil’in Habibti, “Shooting Back” arguably holds the
promise that watching the footage is an act of activism in itself, what Littler calls “implicit” activism
(2005: 233). For many people who see video of masked settlers assaulting Palestinian farmers,
watching this footage is the greatest contribution they will make to the Palestinian cause. This is
inherent in the strategy of viral campaigns, which aim to build a broad counter-hegemony on a network
of weak ties that require minimal investment from activists. These campaigns measure success in large
part through viewer counts on websites and the number of times a video clipped is linked to or reposted.
“Shooting Back” is consistent with the broader problem of human rights activism whose
principal strategy is to “mobilize shame” through a constellation of local and international human
rights networks, Western publics, international institutions and foreign states. The assumption is that
with incontrovertible proof of rampant human rights violations in the OPT, powerful actors will
intervene to pressure the Israeli state to curtail its troubling practices. Palestine-Israel is one of the most
heavily reported on areas in the world by human rights organizations. Moreover, there is a remarkable
consensus amongst researchers that Israel’s human rights record is very poor (Finkelstein 2006). This
includes indigenous groups as well as international ones such as Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch. However, the effect of this level of scrutiny on Israeli practices is difficult to measure.
In theory, the proliferation of video cameras in the OPT could serve as a restraint on IDF and settler
brutality if the state of Israel chooses to try to avoid the criticism of human rights groups. “Shooting
Back” is a compelling attempt to make the work that human rights groups do more verifiable,
accessible to a larger public and more interesting to media outlets.




These criticisms notwithstanding, there are compelling reasons to believe that “Shooting Back”
contributes to Palestinian agency and may be an important tactic in the struggle against colonialism.
Palestinians who participate in the “Shooting Back” report feeling empowered by the ability that the
project gives them to represent their situation and the newfound leverage they have on soldiers and
settlers. Furthermore, the project has been successful in raising awareness about the indignities of
Occupation.

Media and political opportunity: integrating media culture with the political
process framework
How do these technologies change the balance of power facing the transnational movement for
Palestine? What, if any capacity do they give activists to shape and create favorable political
opportunities? Media and information function as an indispensible part of the Palestinian solidarity
movement and have the potential to become considerably more significant in the near future. Christian
Smith writes that a central thesis of the political process model is that movements “prosper only when
challengers enjoy concurrently expanding political opportunities, strong facilitating organizations, and
rising insurgent consciousness” (1996: 88). Media orientated activism creates new possibilities for
pro-Palestinian activists to enjoy concurrently expanding political opportunities by potentially
reshaping public consciousness of the Palestine-Israel conflict; building a wider and more diverse
counter-hegemonic coalition; strengthening the consciousness of activists and providing new venues
for activism.
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink write that, “Technological and institutional change can
alter the ‘moral universe’ in which action takes place by changing how people think about
responsibility and guilt and by supplying them with new ways to act” (2000: 37). The experiences of
past social movements provides numerous examples of the ways in which new media offers the
transnational pro-Palestinian movement the chance to expand political opportunities in at least three
significant ways. First, reporting facts can affect change by increasing the number of people who are




aware of the indignities of the Occupation and calling upon them to act in solidarity with the
Palestinians. The information politics of the 19th century transnational abolitionist movement are an
example of a movement using facts to re-shape the political culture. Anti-slavery activists compiled
cogent and detailed books based on the testimonies of slaves (or the fictionalization of these
testimonials such as Uncle Tom’s Cabin), which helped to cement public opinion in Britain against
slavery, and contributed to the UK’s decision not to recognize the Confederacy (Keck and Sikkink
2000). Secondly, the embarrassing exposure of Israel’s harsh counter-protest tactics in the OPT could
pressure the Israeli government to abandon some of its counter-protest tactics, which could incentivize
Palestinians, Israelis and internationals to participate in more demonstrations in the future. In 1994,
after the Zapatista insurgency was militarily defeated, the attention that the transnational Zapatista
network brought to the uprising in Chiapas succeeded in persuading the Mexican government to
respect the Zapatistas call for a cease-fire. As a result, the Zapatistas were given the space to continue
to their uprising, albeit through non-violent methods (Bob 2001).
Thirdly, the use of new media allows activists the opportunity to rapidly mobilize across
borders and to unite different social movement organizations and activist traditions in a common
protest. This can include using new media to organize large groups of people in a common
demonstration or organizing on the Internet through petitions, creating issue-specific websites and
signing petitions. The protests against the World Trade Organization, which took place in Seattle
during November 1999, connected social movement organizations rooted in organized labor with extramovement activists through Internet technologies such as e-mail listservs. As the protests continued
activists used the Internet as a source for intra-movement information and to represent the
protests/counter-protests to the mainstream media (Smith 2001). Media can also help social movements
simultaneously organize in different places around significant events such as the anti-apartheid
movement’s mobilizations in the midst of the Soweto uprisings and the death of Steve Biko (Thorn
2006: 296).




Today’s small media offers increased opportunities for activists to create counter-hegemonic
discourses and build wide-ranging coalitions. Communicative technologies can both legitimize and
undermine states and resistance movements. The de-colonization movement of the post-WW2 period
advanced a counter-hegemony of radical, anti-colonial discourse that was constituted through a canon
of counter hegemonic texts exemplified by Gillo Pontecorvo’s The Battle of Algiers and Frantz Fanon’s
Wretched of the Earth. These are historically informed and highly stylized accounts of the
decolonization process that were calculated to appeal to the sensibilities of elite European and
American audiences (Slisli 2008) as well as other revolutionaries. The Algerian independence
movement is the paradigmatic example of a twentieth century anti-colonial movement which, although
increasingly outmatched by France’s military counter-mobilization and its political overtures to the
Algerian people, was able to overthrow the colonial state in part by constructing a wide ranging counter
hegemony that extended deep into France’s intellectual, political and popular spheres. Reports of
widespread torture of Algerian activists and civilians by French forces created a crisis of legitimacy
within the French network of juridical, military and political orders that was both promoted and
exploited by the Algerian nationalist movement’s leaders and the legion of French writers and activists
in their support.
The historical ability of other revolutionary movements to successfully mobilize counter claims
against a hegemonic ideology of colonialism offers an encouraging example for the Palestinian cause.
The inability of the Palestinians to maintain a rebel insurrection in Jordan, Lebanon or the OPT, the
failed attempt to imitate the Hezbollah model of resistance during the second intifada, the
sequesterization of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah’s own immobility within Lebanese and
world politics are all evidence that the political environments in which the Palestinian national
movement and its solidarity compliment are active are inhospitable to a highly militant politics. In this
context, there is an increased burden to build the type of counter hegemony that the Palestinian
movement is reaching for.




For a decentralized and marginalized transnational movement, film and especially Internet
videos already play the important role of creating networks of communication amongst activists
throughout the world. Understanding this role clarifies the movement’s dynamics. As we have seen, the
solidarity movement is highly decentralized and in most respects non-hierarchal. There is no central
party or commanding organization attempting to direct and coordinate the movement’s various
components even within a specific project. Local groups are given a large amount of leeway in
deciding how to apply the directives of the BNC, PACBI and Stop the Wall! The communications
strategy of the movement largely reflects this level of decentralization. The creation of a revealing new
video spreads throughout a network of Palestinian and solidarity websites extremely quickly,
reiterating a sense of collective identity amongst participants. For the solidarity movement, the videos
differ from other sources of news because they break through the “conventional wisdom” about how
the conflict is represented and in doing so they communicate the promise that the Palestinians and their
allies are developing the tools to break Israeli hegemony over the Palestinians and thus promote further
participation. The Internet, and the viral video, have increased the opportunity to create broad-based
coalitions within the solidarity movement. The re-posting of a video from a human rights group on a
news blog or activist website can substantially increase visibility without exacting a significant cost
from any of the actors involved.
Video deployments are likely to play an important role in the formation of activist identity
because they are congruent with more general trends in the culture of progressive politics, which put an
emphasis on representation over other material sources of power such as class, state and military
power. Battles over representation are both a tactic in politics and an expressive act that is fundamental
to the construction of the identity of individual activists and the movements they are a part of. In her
anti-consumerist manifesto, No Logo, Naomi Klein bemoans that by the early 1990s, the North
American left had become almost exclusively committed to fighting battles “over issues of
‘representation’—a loosely defined set of grievances mostly lodged against the media, the curriculum”




while leaving economic issues untouched (Klein 2000: 107 quoted in, Littler 2005: 230). In a general
context, the equation of politics with representation is further evidenced by the growth of media
studies, a sub discipline of sociology and the popularity in scholarly and activist circles of works such
as Edward Said’s Orientalism and Ernesto Laclau and Chantell Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy that borrow Antonio Gramsci’s notion of cultural hegemony while rejecting Marxism’s
position that history has a determinative economic base.
In the context of Palestinian solidarity, a significant number of books claiming to expose the
distortions of previous scholarship (Finkelstein 1995; Finkelstein 2005; Said and Hitchens 2001;
Chomsky 1983) and biased media coverage (Friel and Falk 2007) join an even larger number of
websites including If Americans Knew, Mondoweiss, MuzzleWatch and Fairness and Accuracy in
Reporting that report on trends in the American media’s coverage of the Palestine-Israel conflict. A
representative view of the importance of representation comes from Norman Finkelstein’s lecture “The
Coming Breakup of American Zionism”: For Finkelstein, the characterization of Israel as a progressive
state has been decisive to American Jewry’s post-1967 embrace of the Jewish State, but the image of a
pure Israel and the Jewish community’s attendant support are no longer sustainable amidst the growing
chorus of reports on Israel’s human rights violations in the OPT (Finkelstein 2008).
These websites document omissions and distortions in the mainstream coverage of the conflict
and reflect on the narrow and generally pro-Israel frames of the media. Furthermore, these sites
encourage visitors to contact news organizations protesting their faulty coverage and highlight
examples of critical analysis and penetrating journalism that go against the grain. As keepers of history
and pressure sources on news organizations, these sites blur the conventional lines between activism,
media analysis and reporting. More importantly, their ability to mobilize visitors as activists dilutes the
barrier between consumers and creators of information. Jo Littler’s critique of the “implicit” activism
of reading a critical book may very well not extend to the Internet world where aspiring activists enter
sites that allow them to transmit the information they have obtained into ever expanding networks.




Conclusion
El Houri and Saber write that it is a “necessity for all dominated and resistance groups to write their
own texts and narrate their alternative history as part of the process of resistance and as an inseparable
aspect of their revolt against the dominant group/narrative” (2010: 73). Unlike the Hezbollah videos
that el Houri and Saber analyze, the video deployments of the Palestinians are created primarily for
foreign consumption and highlight certain themes (human rights) or use frames (“Avatar”) that are
selected for their expected resonance with foreign publics. Palestinians are taking advantage of the
possibilities that video creates to “write their own texts,” but their control over their own narrative is
profoundly influenced by foreign influences and demands. The recent innovations in Palestinian protest
and solidarity that are described throughout this paper represent a unique stage in the history of the
Palestinian national movement, in which aspects of the Palestinian grassroots, internationalized
Palestinian elites outside of the major political party-power structures and international civil society are
actively forming a global civil society. Activists have been given a new chance to use information to
change the larger set of ideas surrounding the Palestine-Israel conflict by presenting information that is
likely to be received as true or by authorities. The process by which this knowledge spreads has the
potential to form an effective political coalition and offer venues for political participation that
construct the identity of the movement.





Conclusion
The conclusion offers an opportunity to state more forcefully the main arguments of this paper, clarify
aspects of its methodology that may be unclear and to begin a discussion of related themes and ideas
are that the author believes are important.

Summary and theoretical reprise
This paper began by asking under what circumstances do transnational solidarity movements have the
ability to influence state policy. My study of the American solidarity movements with East Timor and
Central America demonstrated that under favorable circumstances movements, in conjunction with
public opinion and elite allies, were able to influence policy. My analysis did not find support for a
unilinear path to movement influence but found a generalizeable logic at work behind different
examples of movement success. My central conclusion that influential movements enjoy concurrently
expanding political opportunities, the capacity to frame an issue on their own terms and strong
mobilizing structures is consistent with the principal theses of the political process framework. Why
then did I center my comparative analysis on the impact of political opportunities rather than the
internal characteristics of movements? In my assessment, political opportunities are a productive point
of departure for this study in a way that internal characteristics are not for two main reasons. First,
political environment to a considerable degree shapes the strategies and characteristics of a movement.
The point at which a movement comes to influence considerable power over its environment a
consequence of a dialectical process in which historical conditions have overdetermined the
movement’s principal traits. Marx’s often quoted line; Men make their own history but they do not
make it under circumstances of their choosing captures this logic. Second, as Theda Skocpol argues in
States and Social Revolutions (1979) a political opportunity centered analysis explains the conjunctural
dimension of social change, i.e. why a movement succeeded at certain points rather than others, with
more clarity than agent-based explanations. The agency of groups plays an important role in their




ability to recognize and act upon political opportunities. However, opportunities begin to shift largely
independent of the efforts or foresights of activists.
Chapter Two argued that US based Palestinian solidarity activists will likely face more
consistently unfavorable dimensions of political opportunities than their predecessors fighting for East
Timorese or Central American liberation. The strength of the Israel lobby within the US and Israel’s
own innovations in social control and the engineering of consent for the Occupation within Israel are
the chief determinants of this situation. In the East Timorese and Central American cases a movement’s
advantage in one dimension of political opportunity opened others. For example, the absence of an
influential pro-Indonesia lobby in the US during the early 1990’s made the solidarity movement for
East Timor one of the few voices on the issue, which helped it to persuade members of Congress to
their point of view. By contrast, in each of the categories of political opportunity examined in this
paper the Palestinians and their allies are at a considerable disadvantage. Consequently, it is unlikely
that their ability to influence US foreign policy will increase in the near future.
The salience of political environment does not totally negate the agency of activists. Gaventa’s
reading of power is useful for understanding the strategic options that are available to the Palestinian
solidarity movement. Gaventa notes that the function of authority is to reproduce and strengthen itself
through its agenda setting and ideological powers. For those with power, Gaventa’s three dimensions
of power: participation, agenda setting and the cultural/hegemonic, expand outwards from the first to
the third dimension. By contrast, social movements trying to challenge power move from the third to
the first dimension. In lieu of elite allies or coercive power, solidarity movements engage in campaigns
of information politics in which they use their intellectual resources to subvert dominant ideologies,
place their causes on the political agenda and get power holders to execute their demands. Gaventa’s
insights on strategy are complementary with Antonio Gramsci’s notion of a protracted war of position
in which challengers seek gradual, cultural change before confronting the holders of power directly
(Gramsci 1971: 238-239). According to Gramsci this strategy is imposed on challengers by a




developed ideological apparatus. The cases of the East Timorese and Central American movement,
demonstrate, how agency can expand under these conditions. In both cases, solidarity movements
underwent a lengthy developmental period before leaving the war of position for a war of maneuver in
which they quickly mobilized once more favorable circumstances arose.
There are significant divergences between the East Timorese and Central America solidarity
movements. East Timor never attracted the mass support of the Central America peace movement and
Indonesia’s violent (arguably genocidal) invasion and occupation of the country remains an obscure
issue in the US. The Central America movement benefited from having a war of position fought for it
by the anti-Vietnam war movement which penetrated deep inside American society and created
opportunities for the Central America peace movement to mobilize from religious and political
organizations. As a result, period between the origination and the war of maneuver of the Central
America peace movement is extremely small. However, war of position remains a useful way of
thinking about the pathways to political influence that challenger groups travel. Furthermore, the
Central America solidarity movement continued to fight to shape public opinion even as it considerable
amount of influence with elected officials.
In Chapter Three I expanded my discussion of political opportunities in order to assess the role
of international relations in shaping the transnational movement for Palestine and determining its
possibility for success. At the international level the Palestinians and their allies are to a considerable
extent stifled by American power. They cannot take full advantage of international organizations to
prosecute Israel either through sanctions or criminal tribunals because of the protection that US
imperialism affords. The international system has helped form the transnational movement for
Palestine in numerous ways. Without access to important institutions the movement has become highly
localized in its activities while maintaining a common articulation of the conflict that to a considerable
degree informed by international norms, legal principles and the research that international institutions.
Because these articles enjoy public legitimacy and are seen as being above partisan affiliations they are




an important way in which the movement creates “hooks” between local circumstances and the
conflict.
Both Chapters Three and Four capture some of the ways in which transnational information
politics both change political environments by introducing new information and socially construct
protest networks by creating opportunities for activists to act politically and imagine themselves as
parts of a larger body. In other words, these chapters are investigations into the solidarity movement’s
ongoing war of position. The central tactic of the BDS movement is to target businesses, schools and
cultural icons and persuade them to first recognize and then dissolve their connections with the
Occupation. Activists use a familiar repertoire of tactics including consumer boycotts and public
demonstrations to pursue this goal.
Chapter Four captured my unresolved mix of optimistic and pessimistic feelings about the
capacity of video strategies to contribute to liberation. The case for optimism runs as follows: The rise
of Internet content and especially viral videos as a source of news and information offers
unprecedented opportunities for activists to reach large audiences and provide verifiable information. It
also has the additional function of giving activists the chance to participate in the movement in new
ways such as forwarding or re-posting videos. The culture of these videos is consistent with other
articulations of agency in the solidarity movement and other challenger movements and will for that
reason continue to resonate. These cultures focus heavily on the importance of countering misrepresentations through the construction of an alternative media and give primacy to information
politics over other forms of solidarity such as armed struggle. The case for pessimism is: Investigating
the reflexive and relational aspects of these practices has the ability to engender a deeper understanding
of how the agency of the transnational movement is imbricated in Gaventa’s third dimension of power.
Although the video deployments discussed in this paper are presented by their distributors as
potentially transformative acts, they also show how in some ways anti-colonial struggles have become
increasingly conservative. In contrast to reflexive texts of the de-colonization of the Postwar era which




argued that there existed an innate connection between violence and liberation (for example Franz
Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth and Jean Paul Sartre’s introduction to it) the videos discussed in
this section illustrate the considerable extent to which challengers have adopted a core element of the
colonial hegemony: that violence against it is impermissible. Or, at the very least solidarity activists
have recognized the sturdiness of this ideology in the larger civil society. Gramsci’s notion that
hegemony functions a set of coordinates dividing legitimate from illegitimate political action in away
that frequently slows down challengers is useful to keep in mind a case where activists are forced into
relinquishing armed struggle because it is illegitimate and then champion their embrace of nonviolence even as non-violence and its representations yield indeterminate and ambiguous political
results. The reconciliation of this dilemma will be found in practice before it is made clear in theory.

Illuminations: Can Social Movement Theory Help Activists?
So far this study has discussed how social movement research helps explain and understand the
transnational solidarity movement for Palestine, we now turn our attention to a related question: what
can social movement research offer the transnational movement for Palestine? It is my belief that the
study of social movement theory can be of benefit to the solidarity movement for Palestine, and social
movements in general. As discussed in Chapter Three movements often study their peers and
predecessors in order to find tactics and strategies that they can adapt to their own situations. However,
these differ from the type of research that I am proposing in two main ways. First, their primary
function is often to provide moral support to activists by reaffirming the justness of their cause and by
assuring them that they have the agency to redress their grievances. Second, the scope of these
inquiries is often very narrow. It is typically limited to the discovery of tactics and strategies that can be
appropriated into a local context. By contrast, the value of a theoretical investigation is that it evaluates
the significance a movement’s successes and failures by putting them by placing them the context of
the dynamics and tendencies of a given relations of forces.





What would lessons could this type of analysis provide to the solidarity movement? My first
piece of advice would be that the movement’s participants and its leaders should make more sober
assessments of the importance of the significance of their recent BDS victories. At the 2009 Campus
BDS Conference numerous presenters, including Keynote Speaker Ali Abunimah, encouraged
attendees by telling them that they were moving at a faster pace than the anti-apartheid BDS
movement. This suggestion is highly misleading. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, the Palestinians
and their allies are operating in uniquely unfavorable political circumstances. Furthermore, these
conditions do not appear to be weakening. Although the BDS movement has won a number of
interesting and significant victories the larger coercive, discursive and political structures, which
oppress the Palestinians, have been untouched by their efforts.
Taking a sober assessment would require recognizing that the transnational struggle for
Palestine will very possibly continue for decades. This perspective could be potentially beneficial for
activists. The fact that the Palestine-Israel conflict will not be resolved in the near future gives activists
the opportunity to develop its intellectual and logistical resources. The histories of East Timor and
Central America solidarity movements shows that the breaking down of ideological and material
structures of power takes decades and the windows of opportunities for challengers to effect change are
typically short-lived. Thus, the solidarity movement should prepare to take advantage of these
opportunities if they open while simultaneously working to erode the strength of pro-Israel ideologies
that dominate in Gaventa’s second and third dimensions of power.
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